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ABSTRACT: The law draws lines. It draws lines between manslaughter
and murder, negligence and gross negligence, speeding and driving legally,
and capital gains and ordinary income. Those lines invariably cause
undesirable results. In particular, lines in the law cause inequity because
they impose different treatment on similarly situated persons. Despite this
inequity, analysts generally embrace the quantitative comforts of inefficiency
analysis. This Article introduces a quantitative model for measuring
inequity. Consequently, the preference for quantitative measures no longer
justifies the disdain for inequity analysis. Instead, democratic and
philosophical efforts to assess laws should embrace now-quantifiable inequity
analyses as the analytical tools of choice.
The quantitative model introduces a method for measuring line-drawing
inequity. The quantitative information it yields illustrates that a line's
location affects the amount of inequity that results from enforcing that line.
The model provides an opportunity to test and rethink the relationship
between equity and efficiency. It demonstrates that the governed may reduce
line-drawing inequity by altering their behavior to avoid negative line-
drawing effects. The model also provides quantitative evidence that the
perceived tension between equity and efficiency analyses is misinformed. In
fact, the model demonstrates that efficiency and equity may correlate in the
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line-drawing context. Finally, this Article illustrates that the criteria used to
draw a line may result in that line having an inappropriate orientation,
and concludes that excessive inequity may signal a need to change a line's
orientation within a law or otherwise alter that law to reduce line-drawing
inequity.
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MEASURING LINE-DRA WING INEQUITY
I. INTRODUCTION
Line-drawing is a prevalent and problematic part of the law. Line-
drawing occurs when the law must distinguish between two legal
phenomena. For example, the law must draw a line between murder and
manslaughter; between negligence and reasonable care; between capital
gains and ordinary income; between speeding and driving below the speed
limit; and any number of other phenomena in various areas of the law.
Drawing lines makes the law administrable and can help deter socially
unacceptable behavior. For instance, the penalty imposed on people who
speed undoubtedly deters some reckless driving.
Unfortunately, line-drawing also creates inequity. A sixty-mile-per-hour
speed limit, for example, may subject someone who drives sixty-one miles
per hour to a $200 penalty but not penalize someone who drives sixty miles
per hour. The two drivers are very similarly situated, but the law treats them
very differently. Despite the obvious inequity, line-drawing analysis has not
traditionally employed inequity as an analytical tool for three reasons. First,
some commentators believe that inequity will result regardless of where the
law draws the line,, whether, for example, the law makes the speed limit fifty
miles per hour or seventy miles per hour. Second, critics claim that inequity
analysis is tautological and therefore unhelpful.- They assert that equity
comparisons are unimportant because the law prescribes the treatment and
defines the class of people to whom the treatment applies.3 They would
argue, for instance, that if the speed limit is sixty miles per hour, the law can
identify speeders by examining the speed of each individual driver
regardless of other drivers' conduct. Third, until now, inequity has not been
quantifiable in the line-drawing context. Consequently, quantitative types
have favored inefficiency analysis.
This Article reveals the weaknesses of these rationales by demonstrating
that inequity can and should be an important part of quantitative line-
drawing analyses, and introduces a model derived from tax law that
measures line-drawing inequity. The model relies upon a tax scenario for
three reasons. First, the Author is a tax scholar and is familiar with the
intricacies of the tax scenario used to construct the model. Second, a tax
scenario provides information that is readily quantifiable. Third, given the
current political climate surrounding tax policy,4 most people are familiar
1. See infra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 68-77 and accompanying text. For example, critics might argue that the
speed limit determines whether a person is driving legally. Measuring a driver's speed is
sufficient to determine compliance with the law, and comparing driving does nothing to
further the analysis of compliance.
4. See, e.g., Victor Fleischer, A Tax Shelter Mitt Romney Could Love, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25,
2012, 3:43 PM), http://dealbooknytimes.com/2o12/o9/2 5 /a-tax-shelter-mitt-romney-could-
love/?nl=business&emc=edit dlbkpm_2o120925; Suzanne Mettler & John Sides, We Are the 96
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with the distinction between ordinary income, which the law taxes up to a
rate of 35%, and capital gains, which the law taxes at a rate of only 15%.5
The resulting inequity from such disparate treatment between these two
sources of income has become a salient part of public discourse.6 The
quantitative model helps to further illustrate the imbalance and suggests
that lawmakers can take steps to reduce it.
The tax-law scenario therefore provides a lens through which to view
the quantitative aspects of line-drawing inequity, and will help develop a
model that applies to every area of the law that draws lines. For instance, the
model should assist lawmakers and commentators when they seek to
determine whether lines in areas such as criminal and tort law are drawn
appropriately. For example, the model illustrates that the ability to change
behavior may reduce inequity if the benefits of changing that behavior
outweigh the costs. Because it is easily avoidable, lawmakers and
commentators will be less likely to fret over the inequity resulting from lines
such as speed limits. Even though a slight difference in speed may result in
significantly different treatment, the model illustrates that the inequity
caused by speed limits is inconsequential because the costs associated with
driving within the speed limit are so small. For those who cannot change
their behavior, however, the location of the line alone determines the extent
of the resulting inequity. In those situations, the model helps determine the
location of a line that will generate the least inequity.
The model also demonstrates how both lawmakers and the public find
ways to reduce the inequity that results from all-or-nothing legislation typical
in many line-drawing scenarios. For example, police officers may use their
discretion and not issue tickets to drivers who drive at only a few miles per
hour above a speed limit.7 In the same token, lawmakers have moved from a
Percent, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2012, 8:51 PM), http://campaignstops.blogs.nytimes.com/
2012/09/24/we-are-the-96-percent/; Andrew Rosenthal, Mitt Romney on 6o Minutes, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 24, 2012, 2:41 PM), http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2o12/09/2 4 /mitt-romney-
on-6o-minutes/.
5. See I.R.C. § l(h)(i)(A), (i)(2) (2oo6) (applying ordinary rates of as much as 35% to
income that does not come within the definition of net capital gain); id. § 1(h) (1) (C)
(providing the favorable rate net capital gain); id. § 1221(a) (defining capital asset); id.
§ 1222(l 1) (defining net capital gain).
6. See, e.g., Bradley T. Borden, Romneys' Tax Returns Underscore Gross Inequity and Extent of
Class Warfare, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 25, 2012, 1:58 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bradley-
t-borden/romneys-tax-returns-underb1228 54 9 .html; Walter Hamilton & Nathaniel Popper,
Mitt Romney Inspires a Look at How Tax Rules Help High Earners, L.A. TIMES (an. 24, 2012),
http://articles.latimes.com/2o 12/jan/2 4/business/la-fi-o 124-romney-capital-gains-20 120124;
Kathleen Kingsbury, Who Pays the Highest Taxes?, REuTERs (Feb. 9, 2012, 11:15 AM), http://
www.reuters.com/ariCle/2012/02/o9/us-who-pays-the-highest-taxes-idUSTRE8171 HS2o 120209.
7. See Margaret Raymond, Penumbral Crimes, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1395, 1404-05 (2002)
("[T]he decision not to enforce speeding laws strictly is often publicly expressed.").
Enforcement officers may also exercise discretion in issuing tickets by, for example, taking into
account the driver's demeanor and other characteristics. See Kim Forde-Mazrui, Ruling Out the
Rule of Law, 6o VAND. L. REV. 1497, 1516-30 (2007). After stopping a driver who is driving
[Vol. 98:971
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regime that recognizes only negligence and contributory negligence to ones
that embrace comparative negligence.8 Such decisions help eliminate line-
drawing inequity. In the case of differential-rate treatment, property owners
developed, and courts sanctioned, structures that help eliminate inequity of
all-or-nothing rules.9 These shifts suggest that all-or-nothing line-drawing
may be inappropriate, and lawmakers should consider changes, such as line
reorientation, to help eliminate the law's ill effects.
Perhaps most significantly, the ability to quantify inequity gives inequity
analysis the mathematical heft it formerly lacked, making it as quantitatively
appealing as inefficiency analysis. The model also reveals that the long-held
notions about the tension between equity and efficiency may be misplaced. ,o
In some circumstances, an inequity analysis and an inefficiency analysis may
reach a similar conclusion about the proper location of a line. To the extent
the two analyses reach different results, the quantification of inequity
analysis, and the democratic ideal of equal opportunity and the
philosophical notion of treating equals equally that support equitable laws,
make it at least as valuable as inefficiency analysis.
This Article proceeds in seven parts. Part II places line-drawing analysis
in context by introducing a hypothetical that illustrates line-drawing
inequity. Subsequent Parts draw upon this hypothetical to build the
quantitative model and explore facets of line-drawing inequity. Part III
introduces the concept of inequity analysis, reviews the general criticisms of
inequity analysis, and, by introducing the intuitive notion of inequity,
illustrates why the criticisms do not apply in the line-drawing context. Part IV
introduces the quantitative model and demonstrates that both the location
of a line and one's ability to change behavior affect the impact of line-
drawing inequity. Part V uses the quantitative model to challenge long-held
beliefs about the tension between equity and efficiency. It first shows that
linear behavior (i.e., left or right movement along a continuum) reduces
inequity, and then illustrates that inequity and inefficiency may correlate
positively with respect to the placement of a line.
Part VI considers the relevance of the orientation of the line. It first
illustrates how the public may create mechanisms to compensate for an
improperly drawn line, which results in waste. This Part suggests that
lawmakers can take steps to eliminate such waste by reorienting problematic
above the speed limit, an officer can learn about the driver's age, driving history, sobriety, and
other factors to assess whether the driver's excess speed likely affects the driver's control of the
vehicle. Id. Other factors such as road conditions, weather conditions, and the amount of traffic
may also affect the officer's decision to give a ticket. Id. (discussing discretion generally and
using police discretion in issuing tickets to illustrate).
8. See 65A C.J.S. Negligence § 316 (2012) ("Most jurisdictions have adopted or applied in
some form the doctrines of comparative negligence or comparative fault.").
9. See infra Part VIA.
1o. See infra Part V.
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lines. Part VII draws upon the general conclusion derived from the
quantitative model to suggest guidelines for lawmakers. It recommends that
when remedying the considerable inequity caused by a line, lawmakers
should consider the appropriateness of that line's location, whether the
public can change its behavior at low cost to cross to the favorable side of
that line, and whether that line is oriented correctly. Part VIII concludes.
II. LINE-DRAWING IN CONTEXT
A single scenario helps identify the problems resulting from line-
drawing and introduces the issues this Article addresses.- Consider two
hundred individuals, each of whom owns a separate piece of real property.
They acquired their respective properties several years ago with the hope
that the properties would increase in value.' The properties are suitable for
subdivision into several residential lots, and each person now has the
opportunity to sell the property. The property owners can sell their
respective properties "wholesale" by transferring the entire property in one
transaction (or blocks of individual lots), or they can sell them "retail" by
subdividing the property and selling individual lots to multiple purchasers.
Each person can use any number of sales up to two hundred to dispose of
the property retail. For instance, an owner could sell the property to four
different buyers using four sales or to seventy-five different buyers using
seventy-five sales. To use more than one sale to dispose of the property, an
owner must do some subdivision and expend some effort to market and sell
the property. Thus, each additional sale represents additional effort
expended to subdivide, market, and sell the property.
The number of sales an owner uses to dispose of the property could
affect the profitability of the property. There should generally be more
buyers seeking smaller pieces of property,'s so the demand for smaller
i 1. This Article relies upon a scenario from real estate taxation. The facts and assumptions
lend themselves to line-drawing analysis and quantifying inequity. Also, the Author is a tax
scholar and familiar with the nuances of the scenario. The level of detail required to create the
model for quantifying inequity demands familiarity with the law in question. After witnessing
the application of the model to one scenario, other analysts should recognize how the model
could apply to other scenarios.
12. The model only considers the consequences of selling the property at a gain. Similar
issues would present themselves if property owners sold the property at a loss and if different
rates applied depending upon similar factors used to classify the property.
13. This follows because the majority of the population is limited in the amount of
property they can purchase. Generally, an individual's or family's only, or largest, purchase of
real property is a home. SeeJesse Bricker et al., Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2007 to 2010:
Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances, 98 FED. RES. BULL., no.2, June 2012, at 1, 42-47,
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2o12/pdf/scfl2.pdf (showing that
primary residences account for about 5o% of the nonfinancial assets of families, that
nonfinancial assets are roughly 6o% of families' total net worth, and that only a small
percentage of families (around 20% of all families) held real property other than a primary
residence). That being the case, only a relatively small portion of the population owns more
976 [Vol. 98:971
MEASURING LINE-DRAWING INEQUITY
pieces of property is greater than the demand for larger pieces of property.
Because subdividing and selling more lots will increase risks and costs, a
rational property owner will do so only if the price is higher for the
additional sales. Consequently, if an owner uses more sales to dispose of the
property, the owner will likely charge more per square foot for the property.
Although the cost per square foot of subdividing, marketing, and selling the
property will increase with each additional sale, due to economies of scale,
the increase in sales price should increase more per additional sale than will
the cost (otherwise subdividing property would not be economical). As a
result, selling property at a retail price is more profitable than selling it
wholesale. Figure i depicts the pre-tax economic gain that property owners
would obtain in relation to the number of sales they make.,4 As expected,
the curve representing the pre-tax economic gain slopes upward as the
number of sales increases, forming a not-unexpected supply curve-as the
price increases, the number of lots available for purchase will increase.
than a single piece of property, and an even smaller portion can afford to purchase large plots
of property.
14. The graph assumes a property owner could dispose of the property in one sale for
$2.01 per square foot, and could charge an extra $o.os for each additional sale used to dispose
of the property. For the sake of analysis, also assume that the cost of the property remains a
constant $1.5o per square foot. Based on those assumptions, a property owner who uses one
sale to dispose of the property would have a $o.5 economic benefit (i.e., the sales price minus
the cost) per square foot on the disposition, and the property owner who uses two hundred
sales would have a $2.50 benefit per square foot. The cost per square foot would increase with
each additional sale. The analysis assumes the cost would be in proportion to the increased sale
price, so holding the cost constant allows for an accurate comparison of the pre-tax economic
gain.
The graphs in this Article present the results of discreet, noncontinuous phenomena
(number of sales) in linear format. Because the phenomena are discreet, the results do not
create actual "lines," but are instead a series of dots that are very close together. Nonetheless,
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Assume that each owner's preference differs from all other owners'
preferences.15 If so, each situation on the horizontal continuum represents a
different property owner (i.e., one property owner would use one sale,
another would use two sales, and so on). Despite the smooth curve depicted
in Figure 1, tax law places all situations into one of two categories: capital
and non-capital (in this case, inventory) income. Tax law imposes a 1 5% tax
on gains from the sale of capital assets held for more than one year.' 6 If the
property is not a capital asset, however, tax law classifies the property as
inventory and imposes ordinary income rates on the gain realized on the
disposition of the property.' 7 The maximum rate that tax law imposes on
ordinary income is 35%, 8 and this Article assumes that all gain from the sale
of inventory will be subject to the 35% rate. Consequently, the classification
of property as capital or non-capital has serious tax implications.
15. Several factors could affect preferences. Although each additional sale adds to pre-tax
economic gain, each additional sale also requires more effort and more risk. Those factors
affect the number of sales a property owner will make.
16. See I.R.C. § i(h)(i)(C) (2oo6) (imposing the 15% rate on net capital gain); id.
§ 1222(l 1) (defining net capital gain to include net long-term capital gain).
17. Seeid. § 1(h)(i)(A).
18. See id. § I (i) (2).
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Property at each "situation" will be either a capital asset or inventory.19
The law must draw the line somewhere along the continuum to divide the
two types of assets. Courts have adopted a complicated and somewhat
ambiguous multi-factor definition to separate capital assets from inventory.20
In considering these multiple factors, courts aim to separate property into
two categories: property that derives its income from services and property
that derives its income from its appreciation in value.21 If the gain on the
disposition of the property is largely from the property's appreciation in
value, the property is a capital asset.2 2 If, on the other hand, the gain derives
largely from services, the property is inventory.5 Thus, the line appears to
classify property based upon the source of income recognized on
disposition.
The number of factors courts use to distinguish capital assets from
inventory varies from four to nine.2 4 One factor-and perhaps the most
important factor-that is common of the tests courts apply is the number of
sales a property owner uses to dispose of the property.2 5 Other factors, such
as subdivision and efforts to market and sell the property, help facilitate the
19. In this Article, "situation" refers to a theoretical point at which a disposition of
property occurs using a number of sales.
20. See, e.g., Thompson v. Comm'r, 322 F.2d 122, 123 (sth Cir. 1963) ("The first
[question] is the old, familiar, recurring, vexing and ofttimes elusive problem of the treatment
of proceeds of sales of subdivided lots as capital gains or ordinary income." (footnote omitted)).
The common law definition of capital asset derives from the statutory definition, which includes
all property other than that specifically excluded by statute. See I.R.C. § 1221 (a) (t) (providing
that the concept of capital asset does not include "stock in trade of the taxpayer or other
property of a kind which would properly be included in the inventory of the taxpayer if on
hand at the close of the taxable year, or property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business"). Courts interpret that language to
determine whether the type of situations discussed in this Article would make the property a
capital asset or inventory.
21. See Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569, 572 (1966) ("The purpose ... is to differentiate
between the profits and losses arising from the everyday operation of a business on the one
hand and the realization of appreciation in value accrued over a substantial period of time on
the other." (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
22. See, e.g., Comm'r v. Gillette Motor Transp., Inc., 364 U.S. 130, 134 (196o) ("[T]he
term 'capital asset' is to be construed narrowly in accordance with the purpose of Congress to
afford capital-gains treatment only in situations typically involving the realization of
appreciation in value accrued over a substantial period of time ....").
23. See Corn Prods. Ref Co. v. Comm'r, 350 U.S. 46, 52 (1955) ("Congress intended that
profits and losses arising from the everyday operation of a business be considered as ordinary
income or loss rather than capital gain or loss.").
24. See, e.g., Hous. Endowment, Inc. v. United States, 6o6 F.2d 77, 81 (5 th Cir. 1979)
(using four factors); Estate of Segel v. Comm'r, 370 F.2d 107, io8 (2d Cir. 1966) (using nine
factors).
25. See Suburban Realty Co. v. United States, 615 F.2d 171, 178 (5 th Cir. 198o) ("It will
remain true that the frequency and substantiality of sales will be the most important factor.");
infra note 44 and accompanying text (listing several cases that have considered the definition of
capital assets and used one of the multiple-factor definitions that included number of sales).
2013] 979
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number of sales, so this Article uses the number of sales as a proxy for all
other factors. The increased activities needed to increase the number of
sales contribute to the gain recognized on the disposition of the property-
as the number of sales increases, more income derives from services. Thus,
the number of sales can be used as a proxy for the source of income.
In so utilizing the number of sales, the law must determine the point at
which the number of sales is too many for the property to appropriately be
categorized a capital asset.26 On one side of the line, the gain will be subject
to the favorable 15% rate; on the other side, the gain will be subject to the
ordinary 35% rate.7 For example, if the law draws the line after the ioo-sale
situation (represented by a vertical line in Figure 2), a property owner who
disposes of his property with loo sales and the property owner who does so
with loi sales would be subject to significantly different tax treatment. The
respective tax rate that applies to each property owner would affect their
after-tax economic gain differently.28 In fact, the curve in Figure 2 reveals
that after-tax economic gain increases with each additional sale until it
reaches the ioo-sale situation. After that point, there is a significant cliff,
and after-tax economic gain begins to increase from the ioi-sale situation
from a rate below that of the loo-sale situation. After the 146-sale situation,
after-tax economic gain again exceeds the after-tax economic gain at the
1 oo-sale situation.20
26. This model simplifies a very complicated analysis. Although the number of sales likely
correlates to the other factors courts use, the correlation is not perfect. Consequently, the law
does not merely rely upon the number of sales. Instead it adopts a facts-and-circumstances test,
which prohibits the ability to draw a line in the abstract. See infra note 44 and accompanying
text. Case law takes into account the period of time over which sales occur. Two hundred sales
over a ten-year period may not be sufficient to establish that the property is inventory. See, e.g.,
Estate of Barrios v. Comm'r, 265 F.2d 517, 520 (5 th Cir. 1959) (granting capital gain
treatment), revg 29 T.C. 378 (1957) (holding that property was inventory because the owners
used 130 sales to dispose of the property over five years). To avoid the complexities that
temporal considerations would raise, this Article assumes that the sales would occur over the
same period of time for each property owner. Based upon that assumption, the law could end
up drawing the line at any point along the x-axis without exceeding the scope of the definitions
of capital asset and inventory. The temporal component becomes unimportant in the analysis
of the inequity caused by line-drawing.
27. Some property owners who recognize ordinary income on the disposition of property
are not in the 35% tax bracket, so they may pay tax at a lower rate. This Article assumes that the
gain recognized on the disposition of the property will ensure that the property owner is in the
highest tax bracket and will be subject to the 35% tax rate.
28. The after-tax economic gain is the gain recognized minus the tax liability. Tax liability
is the amount of gain recognized multiplied by the applicable tax rate. The property owner
should focus on the after-tax economic gain because the benefit derived from the sale depends
upon the amount of tax the property owner has to pay with respect to the sale.
29. The after-tax economic gain at the loo-sale situation is $1.275 and at the 146-sale
situation it is $1 74; however, it is $1.281 atthe 147-sale situation.
[Vol. 98:971z
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FIGURE 2













0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200
Number of Sales
The pre-tax economic gain at any two adjacent points is very similar (see
Figure 1), but the difference in after-tax economic gain at the points on
either side of the vertical line that separates capital assets from inventory is
substantial (see Figure 2). Despite this substantial difference in after-tax
economic gain, there is hardly any practical difference between these two
situations, save for their location with respect to the line. Consequently, the
disparate tax treatment intuitively appears to cause inequity.3o
3o. Line-drawing alone does not create inequity in this scenario. Thus, a note about the
scenario is in order. The idea of taxing gain from property and income from services at
different rates is inequitable under the abilities theory. See Bradley T. Borden, The Like-Kind
Exchange Equity Conundrum, 6o FLA. L. REv. 643, 677-78 (2oo8) (discussing the abilities
theories and other theories that could produce a different analytical result). Both types of
income bestow the same ability to pay tax. The Author recognizes that different tax rates for
capital gain and gain from the sale of inventory are inequitable from an abilities perspective.
For the sake of analysis, this Article assumes that the different tax treatment is an immutable
part of the law, and analyzes the law in its current second-best setting, providing an opportunity
to construct an analytical model. Despite this undesirable setting, the resulting model provides
insight and has broad application. Even if the law eliminated the distinction between two types
of income, the need to draw lines would arise in other areas, and the findings using this
property-owner scenario should apply to those areas as well. In this second-best setting the
analysis turns to measuring inequity.
This Article also rejects the notion that illiquidity affects ability to pay. Instead, it
recognizes that illiquidity affects the value of property and values determine the ability to pay.
2013]
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To examine several questions relating to line-drawing, this Article
introduces and uses quantitative inequity, or the measurement of the extent
to which the actual treatment of two situations differs from the most
appropriate treatment of those two situations. First, can changing the
location of a line help reduce or eliminate inequity? The general notion is
that the location of a line generally does not affect inequity.3' For example,
the inequity that exists when the line is drawn at the too-sale situation will
generally remain whether the line is drawn at the 50- or 15o-sale situation.
Thus, moving the line would not appear to make the line any more or less
inequitable. Quantitative inequity provides an opportunity to test that
general understanding of the relevance of a line's location, and shows that
the placement of the line may in fact affect the severity of the resulting
inequity.
Second, does one's ability to change behavior affect how inequitable a
line is? Although commentators recognize that drawing lines does create
inequity and affect behavior, they do not appear to consider whether one's
ability to change his situation will alter line-drawing inequity.32 At first blush,
the line between capital asset and inventory may appear to be inequitable
because it treats two very similar situations differently. Nonetheless, a
property owner can, at little cost, avoid inventory classification by choosing
to dispose of his property with fewer sales.33 The law appears to be less
inequitable for penalizing a person for doing something that person could
have avoided at little or no cost. The cost of using one fewer sale to dispose
of property is low, and generally, penalizing someone who does not incur
that small cost does not offend our intuitive notion of equity. This
conclusion suggests that in measuring line-drawing inequity, one should
consider the cost a person must incur to fall on the favorable side of the
line.
Third, can quantitative inequity further our understanding of the
relationship between equity and efficiency? The ability to change behavior at
This Article also does not empathize with property owners who have to sell property to pay tax,
and it ignores sentimental value that owners may claim to have in certain property. Stated
differently, this Article assumes a person's sentimental value of money would be the same as the
sentimental value of a piece of property, and a law that does not treat income from the
property's appreciation in value the same as it treats income from services would be inequitable.
31. See David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficienty in the Tax Law, 84 CORNELL
L. REV. 1627, 1643-49 (1999) (describing the failure of the traditional line-drawing theory in
affecting inequity).
32. See generally Borden, supra note 3o, at 692-96 (suggesting that line-drawing is more
equitable if the law draws the line to contemplate the similarities of various situations, the
purpose of the law, and whether the location of the line will promote or deter behavior);
Weisbach, supra note 31, at 1659-75 (arguing that the line should be drawn in such a manner
to minimize the effect it has on behavior, and the line's location should be uninfluenced by any
inequity it may cause).
33. See supra text accompanying note 28 (discussing the effect the number of sales have on
the classification of property as inventory or capital gain).
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a low cost may reduce inequity, but the traditional understanding is that a
law is inefficient if it causes behavioral changes.34 Changing one's behavior
requires him to incur some cost, so doing so would be inefficient if it did not
result in some benefit to society.35 This problem illustrates the generally
accepted tension between equity and efficiency-as one decreases, the other
appears to increase.36 Quantitative inequity illustrates that existing notions
of the relationship between equity and efficiency may be incorrect-that
inequity and inefficiency may in fact be positively correlated.
Fourth, does the orientation of the line affect the amount of resulting
line-drawing inequity? People are not always in a position to alter their
situation, so a law that draws a line based upon an unchangeable attribute or
position may be inequitable on its face. For example, a law that discriminates
based upon race or sex would generally be inequitable because people
cannot change their race or sex. Suggesting that someone should consider
such a change to obtain more favorable legal treatment offends our most
fundamental sense of fairness and decency. Furthermore, race and sex do
not usually relate to the stated purpose of discriminatory laws. For example,
a law could provide that only women should be allowed to attend college.
The stated purpose of that law might be that only people who are
intellectually qualified should attend college. The problem with using sex as
the criteria for this law is that a person's sex does not determine her
intellectual qualifications. As a consequence, laws that discriminate based on
such criteria will always be inequitable. The criteria used to draw lines are
critical, and they often relate to the orientation of a line. By changing the
criterion from sex to intelligence, the hypothetical law governing college
admission reorients the line and would appear to reduce inequity.
The quantitative model for measuring inequity addresses each of these
questions. The frame of reference for each question relies upon inequity as
a valid tool for analysis. Although inequity analysis has been the subject of
criticism by some commentators, a critical examination of those criticisms
34. See HARVEY S. ROSEN & TED GAYER, PUBLIC FINANCE 329-47 (9 th ed. 2o1o)
(demonstrating that a tax is inefficient if it changes behavior, causing consumer surplus to fall
more than the revenues the tax generates); see also infra Part V (computing the inefficiency
resulting from line-drawing based on specific assumptions).
35. See ROSEN & GAYER, supra note 34, at 329-47.
36. See, e.g., Nan D. Hunter, Risk Governance and Deliberative Democracy in Health Care, 97
GEO. L.J. 1, 59 (2oo8) (recognizing "the inherent tensions and trade-offs between equity and
efficiency in health care"); Rachel F. Moran, Brown's Legacy: The Evolution. of Educational Equity,
66 U. PITT. L. REV. 155
, 
168 (2004) ("Because of inherent tensions between equity and
efficiency, bureaucratic managerialism, as typified by high-stakes testing, can degenerate into a
failed, incomplete, or even cynical initiative."). But see A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN
INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 9 (4 th ed. 201 1) ("Whether there is in fact a conflict
[between equity and efficiency] depends on the specific distributional consequences of
pursuing efficiency and on what constitutes an equitable distribution of income.").
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and the introduction of the quantitative model help establish inequity
analysis as a valuable part of line-drawing analysis.
III. OVERVIEW OF INEQUITY ANALYSIS
The goal of inequity analysis is to ensure that laws are equitable. A law's
desirableness should be inversely related to the amount of inequity it
creates. Thus, inequity analysis (as opposed to equity analysis) becomes
important in measuring the desirableness of a law.37 Inequity analysis most
likely derives from moral and philosophical writings on equality.38 The
origin of inequity analysis is attributed to Aristotle: "[Equity] in morals
means this: things that are alike should be treated alike, while things that are
unalike should be treated unalike in proportion to their unalikeness."39 The
model for quantitative inequity analysis introduced in this Article aims to
measure whether things that are unalike are treated unalike in proportion
to their unalikeness. A law will be inequitable to the extent it fails to treat
things differently in proportion to their differences. Quantitative inequity
37. "Inequity analysis" also helps alleviate confusion that arrives from the use of "equity
analysis," which may refer to the analysis of security instruments, such as corporate stock.
38. Some commentators use "equality" in recent moral and philosophical discussions to
present the concept this Article refers to as "equity." See, e.g., Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of
Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982). This Article uses the term "equity" because it follows the
tradition in tax law and policy discussions. Furthermore, this Article distinguishes substantive
equity (treating likes alike and ensuring just laws) from procedural equity. See MARK W. JANIS,
AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAw 67, 75 (4 th ed. 2003) (distinguishing substantive
equity from procedural equity in international law). Procedural equity refers to a judiciary's
ruling in the absence of law or against law based upon principles that appear to produce a just
result. See id. at 69-70 (recognizing that procedural equity may allow a judge to act intra legem,
i.e., within the law to achieve the law's intent; praeter legem, i.e., beyond the law to fill in gaps or
supplement the law with equitable rules; or contra legem, i.e., against the law to achieve an
equitable result despite the law's explicit injunction). Equity, as used in this manner, refers to
procedural equity recognized by English law. See GEO. TUCKER BISPHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF
EQUITY 1-2 (Joseph D. McCoy ed., 1 i th ed. 1931 ) ("Equity, in its technical and scientific legal
sense, means neither natural justice nor even all that portion of natural justice which is
susceptible of being judicially enforced. It has, when employed in the language of English law, a
precise, definite and limited signification, and is used to denote a system offjustice which was
administered in a particular court ...."); BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 619 (9th ed. 2009) ("3. The
recourse to principles of justice to correct or supplement the law as applied to particular
circumstances <the judge decided the case by equity because the statute did not fully address
the issue>."). This Article focuses on the extent to which the law treats similarly situated people
similarly, so its concern is substantive, not procedural, equity.
39. Westen, supra note 38, at 542-43 (quoting ARISTOTLE, ETHICA NICOMACHEA V.3
1131a-31b (W.D. Ross trans., 1925)) (attributing the origin of the study of equality and the
articulated statement of equality to Plato and Aristotle). Other translations attribute less
directness to Aristotle: "For if the persons be not equal, their shares will not be equal; and this is
the source of disputes and accusations, when persons who are equal do not receive equal
shares, or when persons who are not equal receive equal shares." 1 ARISTOTLE, THE
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analysis, so described, is derivative of, but different from, the general
concepts of equity. Those general concepts have been the subject of sharp
criticism.40 Because quantitative inequity analysis derives from the general
concepts, those concepts and their shortcomings warrant attention.
A. GENERAL CONCEPTS OFEQUITY
The general concepts of equity inform the specific aspects of inequity
analysis and deserve consideration. An earlier article referred to the
comparison of likeness (i.e., treating likes alike) as the Aristotelian concept
of equity.4, From that simplistic understanding, equity can have two
conceptual interpretations: it can be understood as a concept that is
"derivative, lexical, and descriptive"-or "lexical equity"-or "essential,
substantive (or comparative), and prescriptive"-or "comparative equity."42
Lexical equity has no normative significance, but comparative equity does.
The property-owner example helps highlight the difference between lexical
equity and comparative equity. Assume the law draws the distinction
between capital asset and inventory at the ioo-sale situation. Any property
owner who uses ioo or fewer sales to dispose of the property will be subject
to a 15% tax rate on gains from the sales. Any property owner who uses
more than ioo sales to dispose of the property will be subject to a 35% tax
rate on gains from the property. Property owners could determine their tax
liability by simply asking whether the number of sales they use to dispose of
property exceeds 100.43
Property owners would gain nothing by comparing themselves to each
other to determine the appropriate tax rate. For instance, assume Adam
used 1o5 sales to dispose of property and the gain he recognized was subject
to the 35% rate. Eve also used 105 sales to dispose of her property. Eve can
determine the tax rate that applies to her by simply looking at the too-sale
cutoff the law uses and realizing that she is subject to the 35% rate because
the number of sales she used exceeds the cutoff. She does not need to
compare her situation to Adam's to determine her tax liability. If Eve were
to determine her tax liability by comparing herself to Adam (i.e.,
recognizing that because she too had 1O5 sales, her gain should be subject
to the 35% rate), the result would be derivative, lexical, and descriptive. The
comparison would be an example of lexical equity.
40. See infra Part III.B.
41. Borden, supra note 3o , at 655-56. That same article also reviewed the general
concepts of equity and their critiques. Id. at 654-6o.
42. Kenneth W. Simons, Equality as a Comparative Right, 65 B.U.L. REv. 387, 394 (1985).
43. Professor Simons used an example involving a family outing to explain lexical equity.
In that example, a mother says that she will take all of her children to a movie on Friday. The
children do not have to compare themselves to each other to determine the applicability of the
mother's rule-by knowing that they are her children, they can know that they are going to the
movie on Friday. Id. at 390, 394.
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The definition of capital asset, however, derives from common law and
requires comparisons. Numerous courts have considered the definition of
capital asset and inventory in the real estate context,44 but they have not
provided a bright-line test. Instead, taxpayers and their advisors must
consider the numerous rulings to determine whether a piece of property is a
capital asset or inventory. The only way to predict the character of a piece of
property is to compare it to those properties discussed in the myriad of court
decisions. Where courts have yet to address the tax treatment of a particular
type of situation, the analysis should compare the new situation to similar
situations that courts have considered to determine the proper tax
treatment of the new situation.
At first blush, lexical equity may appear to apply to line-drawing
analysis. All situations on one side of the line are subject to the rules that
apply to that side of the line (i.e., all situations with more than a certain
number of sales will be inventory). No comparison of situations on that side
of the line is needed to determine culpability. But line-drawing analysis is
more nuanced; it must ask whether a line causes alikes to be treated
differently. That question turns on whether the situations on either side of
the line are alike. The inquiry invokes more than mere lexical equity-or
simply asking how the law applies-but something different from
comparative equity, which does not look for a reference point to determine
how the law should apply. Inequity analysis in the line-drawing context thus
varies from traditional equity analyses-it must consider whether situations
on either side of the line are alike. If they are, treating them differently as a
result of line-drawing would be inequitable. Because all situations are alike
in some respects and unalike in others, the analysis must adopt appropriate
criteria to determine alikeness,45 as inappropriate criteria may result in
unintended inequity. To prevent this, the analysis should consider the
purpose for which a law was enacted to determine how it was meant to apply
44. See, e.g., Major Realty Corp. v. Comm'r, 749 F.2d 1483 (11th Cir. 1985); Sanders v.
United States, 740 F.2d 886 (1 1th Cir. 1984); Redwood Empire Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Comm'r,
628 F.2d 516 (9 th Cir. 198o); Suburban Realty Co. v. United States, 615 F.2d 171 (5 th Cir.
198o); Devine v. Comm'r, 558 F.2d 807 (5 th Cir. 1977); Philhall Corp. v. United States, 546
F.2d 210 (6th Cir. 1976); Jersey Land & Dev. Corp. v. United States, 539 F.2d 311 (3 d Cir.
1976), abrogated by Pleasant Summit Land Corp. v. Comm'r, 863 F.2d 263 (3d Cir. 1988);
Biedenharn Realty Co. v. United States, 526 F.2d 409 (5 th Cir. 1976); Huxford v. United
States, 441 F.2d 1371 (5 th Cir. 1971); United States v. Winthrop, 417 F.2d 905 (5 th Cir. 1969);
Thompson v. Comm'r, 322 F.2d 122 (5 th Cir. 1963); Tidwell v. Comm'r, 298 F.2d 864 (4 th
Cir. 1962); Sovereign v. Comm'r, 281 F.2d 830 (7 th Cir. 196o); Gudgel v. Comm'r, 273 F.2d
206 (6th Cir. 1959); Frankenstein v. Comm'r, 272 F.2d 135 (7 th Cir. 1959); Estate of Barrios v.
Comm'r, 265 F. 2 d 517 (5 th Cir. 1959); Guardian Indus. Corp. v. Comm'r, 97 T.C. 308 (1991);
Daugherty v. Comm'r, 78 T.C. 623 (1982); Buono v. Comm'r, 74 T.C. 187 (ig8o).
45. See J.R. Lucas, Vive la Diffrence, 53 PHIL. 363, 363-64 (1978) ("Men are all alike,
and ... Men are all different.").
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to individuals.46 Thus, the focus turns to determining the alikeness of
persons affected by line-drawing.
John Rawls' work reinforces the need for purposeful criteria in general
inequity analysis; his theories inform the development of inequity analysis
used in the line-drawing context. Rawls provides that equity "is defined by
the first principle of justice and by such natural duties as that of mutual
respect; it is owed to human beings as moral persons."47 Stated differently,
"The essence of [equity] that matters in America is the idea that 'one person
is as good as another,' that each of us is a respected participant in the
society, a member who counts for something."48 Under the Rawlsian concept
of equity, stigmatizing a group would cause inequity because such actions
treat some people as not quite human, which is a breakdown of justice.49
The Rawlsian approach exposes weaknesses in the Aristotelian concept of
equity. A caste system may group likes in similar classes based on some
criteria such as sex or race. Rules of the system could apply to one class but
not another without violating the express language of the Aristotelian
concept of equity.5o Such rules would, however, violate the Rawlsian concept
of equity because "some are considered inferior, treated as though they
46. See Kent Greenawalt, How Empty Is the Idea of Equality ?, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1167, 1178
(1983) ("In order to decide what persons are relevantly equal or unequal, substantive
judgments have to be made about what characteristics count."). Norms of equality should
inform lawmakers' decisions regarding rules related to presently unidentified individuals. Id. at
1 178-79. Lawmakers should, however, disregard irrelevant factors. Id. at 1 179.
47. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORYOFJUSTCE 447 (rev. ed. 1999).
48. Kenneth L. Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 GA. L. REv. 245, 272 (1983). A great
modern-day philanthropist and business icon also appeals to equity in his recent call to arms:
But humanity's greatest advances are not in its discoveries-but in how those
discoveries are applied to reduce inequity. Whether through democracy, strong
public education, quality health care, or broad economic opportunity-reducing
inequity is the highest human achievement.
I hope you will judge yourselves not on your professional accomplishments alone,
but also on how well you have addressed the world's deepest inequities... on how
well you treated people a world away who have nothing in common with you but
their humanity.
Remarks of Bill Gates, Harvard Commencement 2007, HARV. GAZETTE (June 7, 2007),
news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2007/o6/remarks-of-bill-gates-harvard-commencement-2007/
(second alteration in original).
49. See RAWLS, supra note 47, at 444 ("Equality of consideration puts no restrictions upon
what grounds may be offered to justify inequalities. There is no guarantee of substantive equal
treatment, since slave and caste systems (to mention extreme cases) may satisfy this conception.
The real assurance of equality lies in the content of the principles of justice and not in these
procedural presumptions."); Karst, supra note 48, at 249 ("[I]t is the imposition of this status
inequality itself that is harmful.").
50. See Westen, supra note 38, at 572-75 & n.126.
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deserve less."5' Rawlsian equity therefore requires more than a mere
comparison of arbitrary criteria; it requires that the criteria represent a
meaningful, appropriate distinction that does not create hierarchies of
superiority.
Rules relating to social inequality help illustrate the Rawlsian approach.
For example, the Supreme Court has recognized that line-drawing criteria
must be related to the purpose of a law, or the law may be inequitable. In
fact, if the effect of a law is unequal treatment, the law may be
unconstitutional regardless of the stated purpose.52 An example illustrates
how the stated criteria may belie the purpose of a law and create an unequal
effect. In Palmer v. Thompson, the Supreme Court held that the city of
Jackson, Mississippi denied African-Americans equal protection of the laws
by denying only them access to public swimming pools.53 The city attempted
to skirt the appellate court's ruling by closing the pool to all people.54 That
rule might satisfy the Aristotelian concept of equity in its simplest form
because it denies all humans access to the pool, thus appearing on its face to
treat them equitably, but the purpose of the rule is obvious, as is its effect.
The closing violates our sense of right and wrong because its purpose was to
deny African-Americans access to the pool, thus treating them as inferior.55
Later, the Court appeared to recognize that closing a public pool for the
purpose of prohibiting a particular group of people from swimming
stigmatizes that group, effecting unequal treatment.56 Here, the Rawlsian
approach required more than merely asking whether the law facially treated
all races equally-it required asking whether the law resulted in harmful
race-motivated treatment to a particular racial group. If a law does result in
harmful race-motivated treatment, it draws a line based upon race,
regardless of its stated purpose and the criteria it identifies to draw the line.
To move beyond perfunctory acceptance of criteria, the analysis must
examine the purpose and effect of a law and honestly assess the suitability of
the stated criteria used to determine the application of a law.
Line-drawing analysis must similarly ask whether the criteria used to
draw distinctions serve the appropriate purpose of law. The Supreme Court
realized that closing public schools was a proxy for racial discrimination and
51. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., I HAVE A DREAM: WRITINGS AND SPEECHES THAT CHANGED
THE WORLD 45 (James Melvin Washington ed., 1992).
52. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-48 (1976) (describing the
relationship between purpose and effect that may determine the constitutionality of a law);
Griffin v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (holding that closing public schools and funding
a private school open only to white students was done to avoid the effect of the law of the land
and was unconstitutional).
53. See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
54. See id. at 219.
55. SeeWesten, supra note 38, at 59o-91.
56. See id. at 590-92 (citing Washington, 426 U.S. at 244 n. 11).
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struck down laws permitting or requiring such closings.57 The Supreme
Court did not merely ask whether the law was race-neutral on its face, but
considered the purpose and effect of the law. As discussed above, the
number of sales may correlate to the purpose of taxing gains from property
at lower rates, but it does not perfectly account for the source of income. In
the absence of a perfect proxy for source of income, a criterion such as sales
may have to suffice in a second-best setting. Nonetheless, Rawlsian equity
requires the analysis to recognize criteria's inadequacies and make changes,
if feasible, to eliminate inequity.
Tax law has advanced inequity analysis in ways that incorporate both the
Aristotelian and Rawlsian concepts of equity.58 Tax law also provides
quantitative measures that help develop quantitative inequity. In tax law,
equity provides that "people with equal capacity [should] pay the same
[amount of tax] ."59 Stated differently, "Units with the same level of well-
being should be liable for identical taxes or transfers," 6° or "equals [should]
be treated equally."65 This approach, which gauges one's tax rate based on
his capacity to afford disposing of more income, or his "ability" to pay, is
57. See Griffin, 377 U.S. 218.
58. John Stuart Mill used the term "equality" in discussing tax policy, recognizing that
equality is as applicable to tax as it is to other laws. See JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF
POLITICAL ECONOMY 735 (Prometheus Books 2004) ("For what reason ought equality to be the
rule in matters of taxation? For the reason, that it ought to be so in all affairs of government. As
a government ought to make no distinction of persons or classes in the strength of their claims
on it, whatever sacrifices it requires from them should be made to bear as nearly as possible with
the same pressure upon all; which, it must be observed, is the mode by which least sacrifice is
occasioned on the whole."). Equity has become the term of preference in and is thoroughly
integrated into tax analysis. See, e.g., Oshkosh Truck Corp. v. United States, 123 F.3 d 1477,
1481 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("[Ulnless there is a rational reason for different treatment, similarly-
situated taxpayers should be treated similarly."); HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME
TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 30 (6th ed. 1970)
("[W]e may say that tax burdens should bear similarly upon persons whom we regard as in
substantially similar circumstances, and differently where circumstances differ."); Richard A.
Musgrave, ET, OTandSBT, 6J. PUB. ECON. 3, 4 n.2 (1976) (recognizing that Simons draws the
distinction between horizontal equity and vertical equity without using such terms explicitly).
Inequity analysis finds use in the line-drawing context in tax law. See generally Borden, supra note
30.
59. RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 223 (5 th ed. 1989). This definition relies upon an abilities theory, but it could rely
upon a benefits theory, under which "each taxpayer would be taxed in line with his or her
demand for public services." Id. at 220. Incidentally, after-tax economic gain probably would
not be the appropriate criterion for measuring inequity under a benefits theory, but the scope
of this Article does not allow for consideration of the public services parties receive in exchange
for taxes paid. Consequently, it embraces the abilities theory.
6o. Robert Plotnick, The Concept and Measurement of Horizontal Inequity, 17 J. PUB. ECON.
373, 374 (1982).




known as the "abilities theory."62 The language used in tax law embraces
Aristotelian equity, but it uses well-being as a criterion, which incorporates
the concerns addressed from a Rawlsian perspective. If Rawlsian equity only
prohibits stigmatizing a particular group, a definition of similarity based on
well-being should help measure inequity. In fact, commentators suggest that
"Americans accept wide disparities in wealth and income, so long as the
system remains open and people at the bottom of the economic scale are
relieved from the kinds of deprivation that stigmatize or exclude them from
participation in society." 63 Thus, tax law would violate Rawlsian equity only if
it eliminated the opportunity for economic advancement for people of a
lower socio-economic status, but it does not necessarily require tax law to
equalize income, and would still allow higher tax rates for the wealthy.
Tax law creates two subcategories of equity: vertical equity and
horizontal equity. Horizontal equity requires that "similar persons should be
treated similarly,"64 which is reminiscent of Aristotelian equity. The
traditional concept of vertical equity "call[s] for an appropriate
differentiation among unequals."5 Assuming the abilities theory applies,
differentiation would depend upon a person's ability to pay tax-thus, one
who has more ability to pay should pay more tax.6 6 Vertical equity generally
informs the debate of the proper distribution of income,67 suggesting that a
progressive tax is appropriate because those with more wealth have a greater
ability to pay tax. This Article does not, however, focus on the proper
distribution of income. Instead, it adopts aspects of horizontal equity
(treating similar persons similarly) and vertical equity (requiring
proportional differentiation) to create a hybrid form of equity, or "hybrid
equity."
To the extent that horizontal equity merely asks whether two situations
are alike and treated similarly, its utility is limited. Hybrid equity considers
the degree of alikeness between two situations and asks whether the law
appropriately comprehends that degree of alikeness in determining the
62. See ROSEN & GAYER, supra note 34, at 356-57 ("A tax system ... should distribute
burdens fairly across people with different abilities to pay.").
63. Karst, supra note 48, at 262-63.
64. A.C. PIGOU, A STUDY IN PUBLIC FINANCE 8 (1928) (emphasis omitted); see also ROSEN &
GAYER, supra note 34, at 366 ("People in equal positions should be treated equally."); Richard
A. Musgrave, Horizontal Equity, Once More, 43 NAT'L TAx J. 113, 113 (1990) ("[H]orizontal
equity... requir[es] equal treatment of equals.").
65. Musgrave, supra note 64, at 113.
66. See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 777 (Edwin Cannan ed., Modern Library 1937) (1776) ("The subjects of every state
ought to contribute towards the support of the government, as nearly as possible, in proportion
to their respective abilities .. . ."). One commentator stated that "[vertical equity] is a matter of
social taste and political debate." Musgrave, supra note 64, at 1 13.
67. See ROSEN & GAYER, supra note 34, at 356-57 ("A tax system should have vertical
equity: It should distribute burdens fairly across people with different abilities to pay.").
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extent to which the two situations should be treated alike. If two situations
are slightly different, the law should treat them only slightly differently. If
two situations, however, are substantially dissimilar, the law should treat
them significantly differently. Hybrid equity exists if the law treats two
situations similarly in proportion to their alikeness and treats them
differently in proportion to their unalikeness.
B. CRITICISM OFINEQUITY ANAL YSiS
Several commentators have criticized inequity analysis. Critics of
horizontal equity claim that it has no independent normative significance, 68
and that using irrelevant criteria to compare persons or situations further
limits its utility. 69 This Article argues that hybrid inequity analysis has
independent normative significance in a second-best setting because it assists
with line-drawing analysis by comparing the treatment of different situations
that lie along a continuum.7o Hybrid inequity analysis requires knowledge of
a law's purpose and also the ability to assess the degree to which situations
on a continuum differ from one another. By asking whether the law treats
situations differently in correct proportion to their differences, hybrid
inequity has independent normative significance in the line-drawing
context. In other words, because a comparison is the only way to determine
if two situations are different and treated differently in the correct
proportion to their differences, hybrid inequity is not merely tautological,
derivative, lexical, or descriptive.
Properly used in line-drawing analysis, hybrid inequity analysis also
overcomes the criticism that inequity analysis is a mere tautology.7' As
Professor Westen articulated, "To say that people are morally alike is
68. See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 61, at 141, 148 (arguing that horizontal equity has no
independent significance); see also David Elkins, Horizontal Equity as a Principle of Tax Theory, 24
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 43, 46 (2oo6) ("[H]orizontal equity can only be justified within the
framework of a theory of social justice that accepts the morality of the market distribution.").
Critics make this claim despite the staying power of horizontal inequity analysis. See, e.g., ROSEN
& GAYER, supra note 34, at 368 ("We are forced to conclude that horizontal equity, however
defined, is a rather amorphous concept. Yet it has enormous appeal as a principle of tax design.
Notions of fairness among equals, regardless of their vagueness, will continue to play an
important role in the development of tax policy."); SIMONS, supra note 58, at 3o; Joseph T.
Sneed, The Criteria of Federal Income Tax Policy, 17 STAN. L. REV. 567, 574-8o (1965) (identifying
and describing horizontal equity's utility as a criterion of federal tax policy). This argument is
particularly relevant in the context of lexical equity. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying
text.
69. See Borden, supra note 3o, at 672-82 (discussing the inadequacy of horizontal equity if
applied with irrelevant criteria and providing examples of such misuse).
70. Other commentators have argued that equity has independent normative significance
in other analytical endeavors. See, e.g., MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 59, at 117-20
(demonstrating how horizontal equity works in second-best settings to determine the more
appropriate tax based on change in welfare cost).
71. See Westen, supra note 38, at 547-48 ("Equality is an undeniable and unchangeable
moral truth because it is a simple tautology.").
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therefore to articulate a moral standard of treatment-a standard or rule
specifying certain treatment for certain people-by reference to which they
are, and thus are to be treated, alike."7 He therefore concluded that once
the standard of treatment is prescribed, that standard should apply to
everyone without regard to others.73 The tautology criticism recognizes the
weakness of lexical equity.74 For example, if the law defines inventory by
reference to the number of sales, a person may determine the character of
property by referring to the number of sales in the definition and the
number of sales used to dispose of the property.75 Therefore, Professor
Westen argues that equity adds nothing to the analysis of the rule's
applicability.
This criticism, however, ignores the effect of line-drawing. Take, for
example, two drivers driving in a 70-mile-per-hour zone-one, say, driving
50 miles per hour, and the other driving 120 miles per hour. Both are
substantially different with respect to safety and fuel efficiency, so treating
them differently under the law appears to be appropriate. Nonetheless, the
law also treats very similar drivers-one driving 70 miles per hour and
another 71--differently as well. Hybrid inequity analysis helps reveal this
potential inequity, and is thus more than a mere tautology.
Another criticism of inequity analysis is that it can never remove
inequity from a system that requires line-drawing.76 A definition of inventory
based on the ioo-sale situation creates inequity because it treats someone
who uses i oo sales to dispose of property differently from someone who uses
101 sales. The law cannot eliminate inequity by moving the line to the 5o-
sale situation because doing so would merely move the equity split from the
ioo-sale situation to 5 o-sale situation. For that reason, some commentators
claim that equity adds little when analyzing lines.77 Quantitative inequity
suggests that the location of the line may in fact affect the level of inequity.
Thus, even though changing the line's location may not eliminate inequity,
it may reduce it.
The utility of quantitative inequity depends upon the criteria used to
measure the degree of alikeness between different situations. This Article
relies on the premise that inequity can be properly measured if a law's
72. Id. at 545 (footnote omitted).
73. See id. at 5 53 .
74. See supra text accompanying notes 41-43.
75. See supra text accompanying notes 41-43.
76. See Weisbach, supra note 3 1, at 1643-49. An earlier article illustrated this in the non-
recognition context. See Borden, supra note 3o , at 675-8 2.
77. See, e.g., Fred B. Brown, Proposal To Reform the Like Kind and Involuntary Conversion Rules
in Light of Fundamental Tax Policies: A Simpler, More Rational and More Unified Approach, 67 MO. L.
REv. 705, 735-39 (2002) (arguing that equity does not inform the analysis of the like-kind
exchange rules). But see Borden, supra note 3o , at 692-96 (arguing that because the law
incorporates the realization requirement, equity must be considered in a second-best situation,
and it appears to provide guidance regarding line-drawing).
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purpose is clear. There are, however, limitations and even dangers to such
presumptions. If line-drawing inequity arises when the law draws a line based
on one set of criteria, simply changing the criteria could result in illusory
equity. For example, some states famously enacted laws requiring people to
pass literacy tests before being allowed to vote.78 They framed and
administered the tests in a discriminatory manner, with the aim to
disenfranchise African-Americans.79 Literacy may appear on its face to be a
valuable skill for voters to possess, but literacy tests became a mere front for
race-based discrimination. If inequity analysis were purely technical, it would
accept the stated purpose of such tests without additional inquiry, and would
fail to identify the embedded discrimination. Such blind acceptance is
problematic. Nonetheless, line-drawing analysis often occurs in a second-best
setting, so quantitative inequity analysis must accept the reasonably stated
purposes of a law.
C. INTUITIVE NOTION OF INEQUITY
Thus far, this Article has assumed that some aspects of inequity are
intuitive. This Subpart fleshes out the intuitive notion of inequity in the line-
drawing context. Line-drawing often treats very similar persons differently,
so the resulting inequity will be greatest with respect to persons whose
situations are closest to the line.s° For instance, the resulting inequity
between treating the ioo- and loi-sale situations differently is high, while
the same between the 2oo- and too-sale situations appears to be low.8 ' Thus,
line-drawing inequity appears to be low at the extremes but higher at
situations closer to the line. The reason for this disparity is fairly intuitive-
generally, it makes sense to treat two very different things quite differently.
A simple Cartesian graph (Figure 3) assists in understanding this
intuitive notion of inequity. The x-axis (i.e., horizontal line) represents the
number of sales used to dispose of property. The continuum begins at the
far left with a single sale. The number of sales increases in equal increments
moving to the 2oo-sale situation on the far right of the continuum. The
situations at either extreme of the line are quite different, but any two
situations next to each other on the line are quite similar. Assume a law,
which must necessarily draw a line, does so at the ioo-sale situation (the y-
axis). That law would treat the loo-sale situation and the ioi-sale situation
differently. The inequity of treating those two situations differently appears
to be quite high because those two situations are quite similar. By
comparison, the inequity of treating the two situations at each extreme
78. SeeSouth Carolinav. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 310-14 (1966).
79. See id. at 333-34. To disenfranchise African-American voters, officials adopted several
cruel practices, including giving white voters easier tests or excusing them from testing and
giving subjective moral-standing assessments. Id. at 3 10-14.
8o. See supra text accompanying notes 26-29.
81. See supra text accompanying notes 19-23.
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differently from situations on opposite sides of the line appears to be quite
low because those two situations are very unalike.
FIGURE 3








The closer situations are to the y-axis, however, the greater the inequity
of treating them differently from a situation on the opposite side. In fact,
treating the two situations immediately on either side of the y-axis differently
would appear to create significant inequity.2 That follows intuitively-as
differences between two situations become smaller, treating the two
situations differently becomes more inequitable.3 This intuitive inequity
illustrated in Figure 3 is inherent in line-drawing.
Figure 3 helps identify other dimensions of inequity that result from
line-drawing. First, as described above, the line generates inequity because it
82. The intuitive notion of inequity may be stated formulaically as simply I= ,/ixI, where I
is the amount of inequity and x is a person's situation measured in units (number of sales in
this hypothetical) from the vertical line. As x gets smaller and smaller, the amount of inequity
moves toward infinity. The formula for the intuitive notion of inequity (I = z/IxI) is the
"inequity function."
83. The intuitive notion of inequity raises an issue that deserves further consideration. As
the differences between two situations become smaller, the inequity of treating them differently
becomes greater. Infinitesimals often do not receive consideration in some fields of study, and
were in fact deemed irrelevant in mathematics for years. See SILVANUS P. THOMPSON & MARTIN
GARDNER, CALCULUS MADE EASY 21-24 (1998). In law, commentators often focus on big-picture
issues and neglect the smaller issues or smaller distinctions. The intuitive notion of inequity
suggests that if the focus is on big issues, instead of small issues, laws can be grossly inequitable.
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treats two similar persons-points A and B, one on either side of the y-axis-
differently. Second, points B and C are somewhat far apart on the x-axis,
suggesting they are significantly different. Nonetheless, the law treats them
the same because they are on the same side of the y-axis. Because the law
treats two significantly different situations the same, it may be inequitable in
another respect. The intuitive notion of inequity does not appear to account
for this second dimension of inequity. The discussion in the next Part
illustrates how quantitative inequity accounts for both dimensions.
Having illustrated the intuitive notion of inequity, this Article now sets
out to test whether the quantitative model for measuring line-drawing
inequity recognizes intuitive inequity. The validity of the model will be
enhanced if it yields a result that reflects the intuitive notion of inequity. To
test the intuitive notion of inequity, a model must quantify and measure
inequity. The next Part introduces the quantitative model for measuring
inequity, reveals that line-drawing evinces the intuitive notion of inequity,
and demonstrates that the location of a line may in fact affect the overall
inequity of a law.
IV. THE QUANTITATIVE MODEL
Quantitative inequity accounts for the fundamental aspects of inequity
analysis established above. Quantitative inequity therefore takes into account
the difference between two persons and asks whether the law treats them
differently in proportion to their differences.S4 The first step in measuring
quantitative inequity is to identify the normative treatment, or ideal
treatment, of each situation, recognizing that at least one situation will be
taxed at 35% and one will be taxed at 15%. A law is inequitable to the
extent it does not follow the normative treatment. Thus, the second step is
to compare the actual treatment to the normative treatment. The following
Subparts introduce a model that measures inequity and then illustrate how
the model provides an opportunity to test common notions of equity and
efficiency in the line-drawing context.
A. MEASURING INEQUITY
To measure inequity, the model must compute the difference between
situations and establish the actual and normative treatment of each
situation. The model uses the assumptions from the property-owner scenario
set forth in Part II. Each situation on the x-axis is identified by the number
of sales used to dispose of the property. The difference between any two
situations is the difference between the number of sales the property owners
at those respective situations use to dispose of their properties. The model
84. This is similar to a notion expressed by Professor Simons. See Simons, supra note 42, at
443 ("[llmplicit proportionality rights require a more complete and complex analysis of the
relation between a person's treatment and the asserted reasons for the treatment.").
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uses the actual tax liability of each situation as the actual treatment for each
situation, so it must determine the normative tax treatment for each
situation.
To determine the normative tax treatment, the model assumes that the
number of sales correctly identifies the source of income. Each additional
sale increases the amount of income that derives from services (i.e., the
efforts of the property owner to subdivide, market, and sell the property).
The model also assumes that the 1-sale situation is properly subject to a
15.1% tax rate and that the 20o-sale situation is properly subject to the 35%
rate.S5 The tax rate difference between the two extremes is 19.9 percentage
points and the two extremes are separated by 199 sales, so they are
separated by one-tenth of a percentage point for each sale that is between
them. In an ideal world, the tax rates of two adjacent situations should differ
by one-tenth of one percentage point to account for the difference in source
of income. Consequently, the 2-sale situation should be subject to a 15.2%
tax rate, the 3-sale situation should be subject to a 15.3% tax rate, and so
forth. With that information, the model can generate a normative tax
liability for each situation and graph them as a normative-tax-liability curve,














$0.00, , , ,
0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200
Number of Sales
85. The model assumes the i-sale situation is subject to a 15.1% tax rate, recognizing that
a portion of the gain at that point derives in very small part from services. That assumption also
simplifies the computation of the normative tax rate for each situation.
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The normative-tax-liability curve represents the ideal tax liability for
each of the situations on the continuum.8 6 The inequity of drawing a line to
separate capital assets from inventory becomes apparent by comparing the
actual-tax-liability curve to the normative-tax-liability curve. If the law draws
the line separating the two classifications of property at the ioo-sale
situation, the actual-tax-liability curve would have a significant kink
immediately following the ioo-sale situation (see Figure 5).87 This kink
represents the significant tax-liability increase that occurs between the oo-
sale situation and the iol-sale situation. The kink also results in an actual-
tax-liability curve that substantially differs from the normative-tax-liability
curve.
FIGURE 5
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86. The curve derives from multiplying the normative tax rate by the gain realized at each
sale-point. Recall from Figure i that gain increases as the number of sales increase, as does the
normative tax liability. Consequently, the normative-tax-liability curve is slightly upward and
concave. The analysis relies upon measures per square foot, as is typical for measuring costs of,
and income from, property ownership in the real-estate industry. Tax liability per square foot is
merely the tax liability owed at any particular situation divided by the square feet of the
property. In this scenario, the number of square feet (the denominator) remains the same, but
the before-tax gain and the tax liability (the numerator) increase as the number of sales
increase. Consequently, the tax liability per square foot is lowest at the point where the fewest
sales occur and highest at the point where the most sales occur.
87. The results presented by the graphs do not create actual lines. Instead, the
representation of the information in the graphs as lines is for visual effect, The curve actually
consists of numerous dots that are in very close proximity, but the curve is not continuous, and
thus the "line" does not technically "kink." See supra note 14. Again, the graphs present the
material in linear format for visual effect, and the text uses the term "kink" to describe the
visual effect that results from the different treatment of two similar situations.
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The next step is to quantify the amount of inequity that results from
drawing the line at the ioo-sale situation. Quantitative inequity requires a
metric that contemplates both the difference between two situations (i.e.,
the number of sales separating them) and the difference between the actual
and normative tax treatment of those two situations. The area of a triangle
accounts for such differences. The model first computes the area of a
triangle based upon the normative curve, using the 75- and 125-sale
situations as comparison points. The difference between the 75- and 125-
sale situations is 50 sales, so 50 is the base of the triangle. The normative tax
liability of the 75-sale situation is $0.28 per square foot, and the normative
tax liability for the 125-sale situation is $0.48 per square foot. The difference
between those two amounts is $0.20, SO 0.20 is the height of the triangle.88
The area of that triangle is therefore 5.s9 Figure 6 illustrates the manner in
which the model determines the normative relationship between two
situations using the area of a triangle.
FIGURE 6
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Inequity exists to the extent the difference between the actual tax
liability of two situations varies from the difference between the normative
88. The unit labels are not important because all differences in tax liability are measured
in dollars, so the model disregards the labels in computing the difference.
89. The area is one-half of the 5o-unit base multiplied by the 0.2o-unit height (1/2 x 50 x
0.20).
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tax liability of those two situations. Therefore, quantitative inequity requires
a similar computation (using the area of a triangle) based upon the actual-
tax-liability curve. The base of this triangle is also 50, because the analysis is
still considering the difference between the 75- and 125 -sale situations. The
height, however, is substantially higher than that of the triangle based upon
the normative-tax-liability curve. The actual tax liability per square foot at
the 75-sale situation is $o.188, and the actual tax liability at the 125-sale
situation is $o.613. The difference between those two amounts is $0.425.
Therefore, the height of the triangle is 0.425, and the area of the triangle is
1o.625, as illustrated in Figure 7.
FIGURE 7
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Using the two triangles, the model is able to determine the extent to
which the law is inequitable with respect to the two points in question. To
determine that inequity, the model first computes the difference between
the areas of the two triangles. It then divides that difference by the area of
the normative triangle.9o The result is a measure of inequity based upon a
single reference point. The difference between the areas of the two triangles
9o . The inequity between two points is the difference of the areas of the two triangles as a
percentage of the area of the normative triangle. The model uses the percentage difference
instead of the nominal value to allow for comparisons of various scenarios with differing dollar
amounts on units of differentiation.
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in this case is 5.625.9' That amount divided by the area of the normative
triangle (5) returns a disparity of 1.1 2.92 This amount reflects the inequity
caused by treating the two situations differently from the normative
standard; the 1.12 measure is the single-reference-point inequity,93 which
measures the extent to which the law treats two situations differently,
disproportionately to their differences. Figure 8 provides a visual
representation of the two triangles, accentuating their differences.94
91. The difference is the io.625 -unit area of the actual triangle minus the 5 -unit area of
the normative triangle.
92. The computation of inequity between the two situations can be stated formulaically as
follows:
normative area - actual area
Single-Reference-Point Inequity =
I normative area
The formula uses the absolute value of the result because the difference between the normative
area and the actual area is relevant. Whether the normative area or the actual area is larger is
irrelevant because the concern is the difference. The same equation can be stated more
specifically as follows:
'A (s.-sn) (nty-nt.) - (s.-sn) (at-at.)
Single-Reference-Point Inequity / (S_______________
/ (S.S) (nynt,)
Where:
s = the situation (i.e., the number of sales)
nt = normative tax liability at a given situation
at = actual tax liability at a given situation
x = situation under analysis
n = situation to which x is being compared
Simplified, the formula appears as follows (for x # n):
Single-Reference-Point Inequity = 1 (at-at.)
(nt.-nt.)
93. The inequity of the 75 -sale situation with respect to the l2 5 -sale situation will equal
the inequity of the 25 -sale situation with respect to the inequity of the 75-sale situation.
94. In Figure 8, the triangles overlap. They would not, however, overlap if they connected
two points on the same side of the line. Similarly, if the actual-tax-liability curve were parallel to
the normative-tax-liability curve, the model would suggest that there was no inequity. The
model only measures inequity that results from line-drawing or from treating two situations
proportionately differently from the normative treatment. Thus, if every situation were taxed
more or less in the same proportion and the curve of the actual-tax-liability was the same as the
curve of the normative-tax-liability, using this model, an upward or downward shift of the actual-
tax-liability curve would not cause inequity.
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FIGURE 8
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The single-reference-point inequity fails to capture the total inequity
that results from taxing the 75-sale situation at 15% instead of the 22.5%
normative rate.95 In fact, the 75-sale situation is subject to the same 15% rate
that applies to all situations from the i-sale situation to the ioo-sale
situation, even though the normative tax rate for each of these situations
differs proportionally to the number of sales. Similarly, all situations to the
right of the ioo-sale situation are subject to the 35% rate, even though the
normative rate for each situation (other than the 2oo-sale situation)
similarly differs across the number of sales. As a consequence, tax law does
not treat the 75-sale situation differently from all other situations in
proportion to their differences.
To determine the inequity of taxing the 75-sale situation at 15% instead
of the normative rate, the model must use the triangle method to compare
the 75-sale situation to every other situation on the continuum. The model
could then determine the total inequity for the 75-sale situation (the single-
point inequity).96 To compute that single-point inequity, the model must
95. The normative tax rate for the 75-sale situation is the sum of the 15% that applies to
the 1-sale situation plus 75 times 1/1o, which represents the 75 sales representing the two
situations.
96. The model averages the inequity measures of the 75-sale situation and every other
situation to derive the inequity for the 75-sale situation. The value of the inequity at the 75-sale
situation is unimportant and would make comparison across systems difficult, but the average of
2013] 1001
IOWA LAW REVIEW
therefore make 199 comparisons of triangles derived for the 75-sale
situation from the normative curve and triangles derived from the actual-tax-
liability curve. That procedure returns a single-point inequity for the 75-sale
situation of o.666217. The same procedure would return a single-point
inequity of 0.569613 for the 125-sale situation.97 Having established the
method for computing single-point inequity, the model can compute the
single-point inequity for every situation on the continuum. The single-point
inequity for each situation is shown in Figure 9. The resulting curve reveals
the quantitative inequity caused by drawing the line at the loo-sale situation.
Figure 9 also notes the highest single-point inequity value (2.04) and the
average of single-point inequity (0.53) of the curve.
FIGURE 9
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The inequity curve in Figure 9 looks very similar to the graph of the
intuitive notion of inequity in Figure 3. This similarity suggests that the
the total inequity of the 75-sale situation and every other situation provides a number that
allows for comparisons among different scenarios.
97. The following formula determines the inequity of a single point based upon a
comparison of the single point to all other points on the continuum (for x * n):
J




WhereJ= the number of situations on the continuum.
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model provides a reasonable measure of inequity. Figure 9 reveals, however,
that the inequity does not go to infinity, even for situations close to the line.
This is because the different tax treatment in this scenario will never exceed
twenty percentage points. If the treatment were more disparate, the inequity
may spike even higher. For instance, in criminal law, a person on one side of
the line could be sentenced to death while a person on the other side could
be sentenced to a maximum of life in prison. That difference in treatment is
substantial, so if the practical difference between the offenses those two
people committed is small, the inequity of treating them differently would
be great-and would perhaps even approach infinity. The model of
quantitative inequity next considers other factors that may affect a law's level
of inequity.
B. How THE LOCATION OFA LINE AFFECTS INEQUITY
By measuring the inequity that results when a line is drawn at each of
the various points on the continuum, the model demonstrates that the
location of a line directly affects inequity.98 Figure lo depicts the inequity
curve that results from drawing the line at the 5o-sale situation. Notice that
the highest point on this new curve (1.81) is lower than the highest point on
the curve that results from drawing the line at the ioo-sale point (2.05).
Furthermore, the average inequity when the line is at the 5 o-sale situation
(0.43) is lower than when it is at the ioo-sale situation (0.53).
FIGURE 1 o
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98. Because the law requires two tax rates, at the left extreme the line will be drawn at the
i-sale situation, and at the right extreme it will be drawn at the 199-sale situation.
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Next, consider the result with the line at the 15o-sale situation, as
depicted in Figure ii. Notice that the highest point on the curve (2.17) and
the average of all of the points on the curve (o.61) are higher than the
respective points on the curves derived from the lines at the 5o-sale and ioo-
sale situations. Because the level of highest point and the average of all
points changes when the line is drawn at different situations, the model of
quantitative inequity suggests that the location of the line affects the level of
inequity.
FIGURE 1 1
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As a general rule, the closer the line is to the i-sale situation, the less
inequity results from line-drawing. Figure 12 plots the highest single-point
inequity and the average single-point inequity derived from drawing the line
at each of the respective points on the continuum. Notice that each measure
of inequity increases as the location of the line moves away from the i-sale
situation, until some point after the 15o-sale situation. Both the highest
single-point inequity and average decline slowly after the point.99 The curve
suggests that inequity is lowest when the line is closest to the i-sale situation.
FIGURE 12
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99. The reason for that leveling and decline may be attributable to the difference above
the normative curve and below the actual curve narrowing after a certain point.
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A comparison of the actual-tax-liability curve and the normative-tax-
liability curve suggests why the overall inequity is lowest when the line is
drawn closer to the 1-sale situation.--- The closer the line is to zero, the
more closely the actual-tax-liability curve tracks the normative-tax-liability
curve, as illustrated in Figure 13.
FIGURE 13
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i oo. The analysis assumes that at least one situation will be subject to the 15% rate and one
will be subject to the 35% rate. Consequently, the extremes of the line-drawing are at the 1-sale
situation and the 199-sale situation.
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The closer the line is drawn to the 2oo-sale situation, the more the
actual-tax-liability curve deviates from the normative-tax-liability curve, as
illustrated in Figure 14. The difference between the curves at these extremes
helps illustrate why the overall inequity varies depending upon where the
law draws the line.
FIGURE 14
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Notice that inequity will always exist under the current assumptions,
regardless of where the line is drawn. If the law draws the line at the i-sale
situation, all but one situation would be subject to the 35% tax rate.' That
flat rate for all but the i-sale situation differs from the normative tax rate,
which varies slightly for each situation. The normative tax rate attempts to
account for the source of income, so as more income derives from services,
the tax rate increases. A flat rate does not account for the different sources
of income. Consequently, a flat rate will not eliminate inequity-it would
treat all situations the same irrespective of their tax-relevant differences.
Thus, a flat rate cannot purge inequity from this system.' °'
iol. If the law draws the line at the i-sale situation, the tax rate will be almost a flat 35%.
Nonetheless, the curve representing that flat rate will slope upwards because the gain increases
as the number of sales increase. See supra Figure i.
102. A flat rate would eliminate inequity only if it disposed of the distinction between
capital gain and ordinary income. If that were the case, the normative-tax-liability curve would
derive from a single rate.
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Noting that inequity is lowest when the line is closest to zero is critical.
The definition of capital asset is the narrowest when the line is closest to the
i-sale situation because fewer properties will qualify for capital asset
classification and gain the advantage of the favorable capital gains rates. The
narrower definition is not taxpayer-friendly. As a consequence, the law that
is least taxpayer-friendly appears to be the most equitable.
This result seems to be different from that which would result from an
inefficiency analysis, which is not unexpected based upon a traditional
understanding of the tension between equity and efficiency. Professor
Weisbach promotes efficiency as the superior tool for line-drawing
analysis.-°3 He suggests the law should draw the line where the compensated
elasticity is low so that the line will be less likely to compel changes in
taxpayer behavior.°4 Compensated elasticity, or price elasticity of demand, is
the "ratio of price to quantity multiplied by the slope of the demand
function."I°5 The compensated elasticity in the property-owner scenario
would be lowest when the line is closest to the 2oo-sale situation, so
Professor Weisbach's efficiency analysis would suggest that the law should
draw the line closer to the 200-sale situation.' °6 This is the anticipated
outcome based upon the common understanding of the tension between
equity and efficiency, but it contradicts the result of inequity analysis. The
discussion below further considers the measurement of inefficiency,
reaching a different conclusion.°7
Line-drawing in the property-owner scenario is an effort to distinguish
between different sources of income, but it creates inequity by drawing a
103. See Weisbach, supra note 31, at 1627-28. Professor Weisbach appears to ignore the
concept of the continuum, suggesting, for example, that if a transaction is a close substitute for
sale, it should be taxed as a sale, and something falling between a security and equity should be
taxed like its closest substitute. See id. at 1661-62. Failure to recognize the continuum is a
serious defect in the analysis because some situations will not be "close" to either extreme, but
instead must be classified.
104. See id. at 1631.
105. See HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICs: A MODERN APPROACH 267 (5 th
ed. 1999). The same formula applies to the price elasticity of supply. See RALPH T. BYRNS &
GERALD W. STONE, ECONOMICS 458 (6th ed. 1995) ("The price elasticity of supply measures the
responsiveness of quantity supplied to changes in price." (emphasis omitted)). Professor
Weisbach applies his analysis to the question of classifying debt and equity without identifying
the relative non-tax demand of either type of instrument. SeeWeisbach, supra note 31, at 1661-
63, 1673-74. If the continuum were created with a negative-sloping demand curve, it would be
unclear which end of the continuum would be appropriate for both debt and equity, making
the computation of compensated elasticity difficult for instruments that fall within either
extreme. See id. at 1661-62.
1o6. The slope of the supply curve in the property-owner hypothetical remains constant
and less than one, see supra Figure i, but the ratio of price to quantity decreases as the number
of sales increase.
107. See discussion infra Part V.B. In fact, the inefficiency is negative, suggesting that line-
drawing in this scenario may affect behavior, but it does not cause inefficiency. That conclusion
goes against the common understanding of the effect of line-drawing.
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single line. The law could help eliminate inequity by drawing more lines and
using more tax rates, depending upon the number of sales. Indeed, the
normative-tax-liability curve is derived from drawing 200 lines and using 2oo
different tax rates. Although numerous lines may be ideal, in the second-
best setting, multiple lines may be impractical.' o5 This model relies upon a
set of assumptions that allow for the convenient computation of a normative-
tax-liability curve. Courts, however, make decisions in complex settings, so
too many lines could make that process burdensome. Thus, one line (or a
few at most) will most likely remain the norm, and inequity will always be a
concern. Having revealed that the location of the line may affect inequity,
this Article next considers how behavior may affect inequity.
V. RECONSIDERING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EQUITY AND EFFICIENCY
Up to this point, the computation of inequity assumes property owners
will not alter their behavior to obtain better tax treatment. This Part
considers how linear behavior (i.e., left-right movement along the x-axis
from one situation to another) may affect line-drawing inequity. The
discussion will show that if a person has the ability to change situations,
changing situations may reduce the inequity caused by line-drawing. The
effect of changing one's behavior may also help identify the optimal location
of a line. The model also provides an opportunity to quantify inefficiency
and refute the traditional understanding of the tension between inequity
and inefficiency.
A. HowLINEAR BEHAVIOR AFFECTS INEQUITY
Recall that Figure 2 revealed a cliff immediately following the too-sale
situation, the point at which the analysis assumed the law draws the line
between capital assets and inventory. The kinked curve in that figure
represents the after-tax economic gain that a property owner would
recognize if the line were drawn at the ioo-sale situation. Because the curve
drops off after the l oo-sale situation, the after-tax economic gain for the
iol-sale situation is considerably less than the after-tax economic gain for
the ioo-sale situation.o9 Given a choice, rational property owners would
prefer to sell their property using ioo sales instead of loi sales; in fact, they
would move from any given situation to any other situation if the move
would increase their after-tax economic gain.
The after-tax economic gain per square foot for the loo-sale situation is
$1.275; it does not reach that level again until the 14 7-sale situation, at
io8. For one thing, many developers use fewer than 200 sales to dispose of property
because their property is not large enough to accommodate 200 lots. The law would have to
devise some system for determining the appropriate rate of tax for each disposition. That would
be an extremely difficult task.
lo9. The cliff occurs because the pretax economic gain of the two situations is similar, but
the tax rates of the two situations is quite different. See supra Figure 2.
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which point the after-tax economic gain is $1.281 per square foot.
Therefore, rational property owners who would otherwise use between ioi
and 146 sales to dispose of their property will use either ioo or 147 sales.
Assuming that those who would otherwise use between ioi and 146 sales
would only decrease the number of sales they use to dispose of property,"10
everyone in the range between the loo-sale situation and the 147-sale
situation would use too sales to dispose of their property, as depicted in
Figure 15. The changed behavior would create a no-sale range between the
ioo- and 147-sale situations.
FIGURE 15
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Because rational property owners will change their behavior to improve
their after-tax economic gain, the model must account for such change in
determining the system's inequity. In particular, the model must determine
the economic equivalent of the after-tax economic gain for each situation
that would otherwise be in the no-sale range. The model adopts a modified
tax liability to determine the economic equivalent for those property owners
who change situations. The modified tax liability accounts for both the cost
incurred to change situations and the actual tax liability. Those property
i 1o. They could of course increase the number of sales to obtain an equivalent after-tax
economic gain, but doing so would require greater effort and some risk. The increased effort
and risk for a similar after-tax result suggests that property owners would use fewer sales rather
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owners who change their behavior will incur a cost-they will give up the
pre-tax economic benefit they would otherwise obtain by disposing of the
property with the number of sales they originally planned to use. The
opportunity cost of moving is thus the difference between the pre-tax gain
they would have recognized if they had not changed behavior, and the pre-
tax gain they recognize after changing their behavior (see Figure 16). The
opportunity cost of moving from the 146-sale situation (pre-tax gain is $1.96
per square foot) to the ioo-sale situation (pre-tax gain is $1.50 per square
foot) is therefore $0.46 per square foot.
FIGURE 16
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To compare the property owners in the no-sale range to other property
owners, the model adds the opportunity cost of moving to the ioo-sale
situation to the tax those persons will pay as a result of using ioo sales to
dispose of their property. The sum of the opportunity cost and the tax
liability is the modified tax liability. The modified-tax-liability curve has two
definite kinks (see Figure 17) instead of just the one kink found in the
actual-tax-liability curve (see Figure 5). The first kink represents the point at
which the law draws the line (the left boundary of the no-sale range), and
the second kink represents the point at which property owners do not
change situations (the right boundary of the no-sale range). The span
between the two kinks helps smooth the line. As a consequence, the
2013] 1011
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modified-tax-liability curve in Figure 17 is more similar to the normative-tax-
liability curve.
FIGURE 17
MODIFIED TAx LIABILITY COMPARED TO NORMATIVE TAX LIABILITY
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The closer similarity of the curves suggests that the changed behavior
reduces the inequity that results from line-drawing. Indeed, Figure 18
illustrates that inequity is lower when people change their behavior as a
result of line-drawing-the high point (0.78) and average (0.42) in Figure
18 is lower than the high point (2.04) and average (0.53) in Figure 9, which
does not account for changed behavior. This result does not comply with the
traditional understanding of the tension between equity and efficiency.
Line-drawing generally creates inefficiency because it would prompt
changed behavior. Given the existence of a line, changed behavior appears
to reduce inequity. The effect that changed behavior has on inequity
suggests that inequity and inefficiency may be related in ways unanticipated
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Note also that the inequity curve that derives from the modified tax
liability is bimodal. The bimodality appears to result from the two kinks in
the modified-tax-liability curve. Because the law causes one to change their
behavior, it in effect draws two lines-one at the ioo-sale point (the point of
the actual line) and one at the 146-sale point (the right boundary of the no-
sale range). After seeing the double-kinked line, the bimodal inequity curve
is less surprising.
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FIGURE 18







Now consider the results if the law draws the line at different points.
The modified tax liability resulting from the line drawn at the 5 o-sale
situation is another double-kinked curve (see Figure 19). The no-sale range
for such a curve spans between the 51-sale situation and the 8o-sale
situation.
FIGURE 19
MODIFIED TAX LIABILITY COMPARED TO NORMATIVE TAx LIABILITY
WITH LINE AT 50
- - Normative Tax Liability
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The inequity curve for the line drawn at the 5o-sale situation is not
quite bimodal (see Figure 20), but it does have two distinct changes in
direction. The slight rise between the distinct points is the highest where the
normative-tax-liability curve and the modified-tax-liability curve intersect.-"
The reason for that rise, however, is not apparent. Again, the highest single-
point inequity (o.82) and the average (0.41) derived from the modified-tax-
liability curve are lower than those derived using the actual-tax-liability curve
(1.S and 0.43, respectively) (see Figure io).
FIGURE 20
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11 1. Indeed, a slight rise appears to correspond to the point of intersection when the line is
drawn at the 1oo-sale situation. See supra Figures 17-18.
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The inequity curve with the line drawn at the 15 o-sale situation is not
bimodal because the curve of the modified tax liability runs off the chart
before it reaches a second kink (see Figure 21). This occurs because, at the
2oo-sale situation, the modified tax liability is less than the normative tax
liability (see Figure 2 1).
FIGURE 21
MODIFIED TAX LIABILITY COMPARED TO NORMATIVE TAX LIABILITY
WITH LINE AT 150
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When the line is drawn at the 15o-sale point, the measurements of the
inequity curve derived from the modified-tax-liability curve (0.71 and 0.47,
respectively) are again lower than the comparable measures of inequity
derived from the actual-tax-liability curve (2.17 and o.61, respectively) (see
Figure 22). This is not surprising because the result is consistent with the
results obtained when the line is drawn at different points.
FIGURE 22
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The location of the line affects the amount of inequity derived from the
modified-tax-liability curve. The pattern of inequity is, however, less obvious
using the modified-tax-liability curve. The highest single-point inequity is
closer to its lowest value when the line is drawn at the 199-sale situation than
when it is drawn at the 1-sale situation (see Figure 23). '12 The average
inequity, however, is lowest when the line is drawn at the i-sale situation and
highest when drawn at the 199-sale situation. These close-to-opposite trends
are inexplicable.,s Nonetheless, the average inequity is perhaps more
important than the highest single-point inequity. The highest single-point
112. The highest single-point inequity is not, however, lowest when the line is drawn at the
199-sale point. After decreasing with each additional sale, the highest point increases at some
point after the 175-sale situation.
113. Indeed, the trend of the highest single-point curve is different from the trend using




inequity only applies to a small number of property owners, so the
probability that someone would be affected by it is low. Consequently, the
model suggests that even if property owners change their behavior, inequity
will be lower if the line is closer to the i-sale situation-the same result
found above using the actual tax liability., ,4
FIGURE 23
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B. PosrrivE CORRELATIONBETWEENEQUITYAND EFFICIENCY
The theory discussed in Part V.A suggests that behavioral changes cause
inefficiency, and that inefficiency would be lowest if the line were at the 199-
sale situation."5 But the model allows for a more precise measure of
inefficiency, which refutes that theoretical conclusion. A more technical
measure of inefficiency is the excess burden that results when a law causes
behavioral changes." 6 Excess burden is the excess of the economic loss
incurred from changed behavior over the increase in tax revenue raised by
114. See supra Figure 12.
1 15. See supra Part V.A.
116. See ROSEN & GAYER, supra note 34, at 329-47.
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the higher tax. 1 17 The model provides an opportunity to measure
inefficiency using the equivalent of excess burden in this scenario. To
measure inefficiency, the model uses the i-sale situation as the baseline and
considers how drawing the line at different points would affect tax revenue
and the cost of changing one's situation. At the i-sale situation, tax revenue
is at its highest because all situations, other than the i-sale situation, are
subject to the 35% rate.- 8 Consequently, tax revenue will decrease if the
line is drawn at some other point, and generally, the reduction in tax
revenue will be greater the further the line is drawn from the i-sale situation
(see Figure 24)."9
Change in pre-tax gain measures the opportunity costs that property
owners incur as a result of changing their situation to obtain more favorable
tax treatment. Pre-tax gain is the sum of the amount of gain each property
owner would recognize, measured on a per-square-foot basis, assuming those
in the no-sale range change situations. Thus, the pre-tax gain of all situations
in the no-sale range will equal the pre-tax gain of the situation immediately
to the left of the line. A decrease in the pre-tax gain that results from
drawing the line at some point other than the i-sale point represents the
cost resulting from drawing the line at some other point. The cost of
changing situations is lowest at the extremes because the no-sale range is the
narrowest at the extremes. The cost of changing situations will be higher if
the line is drawn at other situations that create a large no-sale range.'20 Thus,
the amount of pre-tax gain decreases, as a general matter, the further the
line is from the i-sale situation (even though that trend reverses after about
the 145-sale situation as the no-sale range begins to narrow) (see Figure 24).
117. See id. at 337-43 (describing excess burden, using a commodity tax based upon a
demand curve as the difference between the drop in consumer surplus resulting from a tax
increase and the increase in taxes raised).
118. This analysis assumes the law must draw a line at some point, so at least one situation
will be subject to the 15% rate and at least one will be subject to the 35% rate. Thus, at the
extremes, the line is either at the 1-sale situation or the 199-sale situation.
1 19. Tax revenue is the amount of revenue that the government would collect from all two
hundred property owners, on a per-square-foot basis, assuming that several owners will change
their situations to reduce their tax liability. All of the property owners who move from the no-
sale range will have the same tax liability as the property owner to the immediate right of the
line. Notice that the curve represents the change in tax revenue kinks around the 145-sale
point. After that point, the drop in tax revenue levels off. The curve levels off because no
situation would be subject to the 35% rate if the line was drawn at that point. Every situation to
the tight of the line would obtain more favorable after-tax consequences by changing situations.
Taxing all situations at 15% thereafter results in only slight changes in tax revenue.
12. The size of the no-sale range gets increasingly large as the line is drawn at points
further from the 1-sale situation. When the line is drawn after about the 145-sale situation, the
no-sale range begins to shrink, moving to the right, because all people to the right of the line
will change situations, but the number of situations at the right of the line decreases as the
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Inefficiency results if the amount of the tax raised from drawing the line
at a different point does not increase sufficiently to cover the cost of moving.
In this scenario, the amount of tax raised actually decreases if the line is
drawn at some point other than the i-sale point, and the decrease in the
amount of tax revenue generally is greater the further the line is from the i-
sale situation. The cost also increases as the pre-tax gain decreases as the line
moves further from the i-sale point. As a result, inefficiency generally grows
the further the line is from the 1-sale situation. Thus, inefficiency and
inequity are at their lowest when the line is drawn at the i-sale situation (see
Figure 24). The positive correlation between inequity and inefficiency
refutes conventional wisdom and casts doubt on Professor Weisbach's
efficiency analysis.l2, Further, both inequity and inefficiency analyses appear
to support the narrower definition of capital asset.
The measure of inefficiency used in this analysis considers only the cost
to the property owner. The result may change if the analysis considers the
cost to society. The model uses the pre-tax gain of the property owners to
measure the cost of drawing the line at different points. Some observers may
121. According to Professor Weisbach's efficiency analysis, the law would draw the line
close to the 2oo-sale situation because that is where the compensated elasticity is the lowest. See
supra text accompanying note so6. Figure 24 suggests, however, that efficiency is lowest at the
i-sale situation.
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claim that the undeveloped property reduces social welfare because the
owner is not using the property for its most optimal use. As a consequence,
critics argue that the sale of undeveloped property thereby harms social
welfare. Even if the property owner does not develop a portion of the
property due to the higher tax rate, however, the effect on social welfare will
likely be nominal.
The benefit of developing the property will likely shift from the seller to
the purchaser, but the societal benefit will not be lost as a whole. For
example, the original owner of property may fall within the no-sale range
and decide to sell the property using ioo sales instead of, say, 125 sales.,22
Those fewer sales indicate that the original owner did less to develop and
market the property. The purchasers of the property may, however, realize
the property has additional economic gain to capture, and may further
subdivide the property and use the equivalent of an additional 25 sales to
dispose of the property. If the purchaser performs the services and sells the
property in proximity to the purchase, the gain the purchaser recognizes will
likely be ordinary income to the purchaser, fixed at the 35% rate.-"3
Consequently, the government will recover the revenue it would otherwise
lose if the property were not developed. The economic benefit from selling
the property using 125 sales will not be lost, but a portion of that benefit will
shift from the original owner to the purchaser. If the highest and best use of
the property can only be obtained with 125 sales, the property will reach its
most optimal use following the work of the purchaser, thus imposing little
social cost.
Now consider why line-drawing may nominally affect efficiency in the
property-ownership scenario. The original property owner would not
develop and sell the property using any number of sales within the no-sale
range because any number of sales above the ioo-sale point would convert
all of the property owner's gain to ordinary income without sufficient
economic benefit to compensate for the increased tax rate. The purchasers,
on the other hand, may purchase the property and immediately take steps to
improve it and sell it using the additional 25 sales or more. That immediate
effort and disposition would result in the income from the sale being
ordinary income to the purchaser subject to the 35% rate. Because the
purchaser never stood to obtain the 15% rate, the purchaser would not
trigger higher rates by using additional sales. Significantly, the government
122. For example, the original owner could sell 99 lots in individual transactions with 99
buyers and sell the remaining property to i buyer.
123. See Estate ofSegel v. Comm'r, 37o F.2d 107, io8-og (2d Cir. 1966) (holding thatgain
from the sale of two lots seven months after acquisition was ordinary income). If the purchaser
sells the property within one year following acquisition, the gain will be a short-term gain taxed
at ordinary rates. See I.R.C. § 1 (h)(1)(A) (2oo6) (taxing gain other than net capital gain at
ordinary rates); id. § 1222 (defining net capital gain to exclude gain from a capital asset held
for not more than one year).
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does not lose tax revenue with this arrangement because it collects 15% on
all the property from the original seller, and it collects tax at a 35% rate on
the gain recognized by the purchaser on the subsequent disposition.124
The nominal social cost overstates the earlier computation of
inefficiency that results from line-drawing in this scenario. In fact, line-
drawing may cause little or no inefficiency in this scenario. If inefficiency is
nominal, inequity would be the only measure of importance. Thus, contrary
to earlier understandings, inequity analysis may take precedence over
inefficiency analysis in some line-drawing scenarios.
VI. THE RELEVANCE OF A LINE'S ORIENTATION
The split between gain derived from a property's appreciation in value
and from services is not precise under a system that draws the distinction
based upon the number of sales a property owner uses to dispose of
property. The effect of line-drawing based on sales may nonetheless result in
a somewhat accurate division of gain from the property's appreciation in
value and income from services. For example, assume that a property owner
expends effort to develop and sell 99 lots. Those sales do not cross the ioo-
sale threshold, so all of the gain on those sales will be subject to the 15%
rate. The original owner sells the remaining portion of the property in i sale
to a developer who finishes the work and sells that portion of the property
using ioi sales. The law taxes the gain recognized by the original owner
(attributable to the property's appreciating in value) at 15%, and taxes the
developer's gain (attributable to the developer's services) at 35%. With
respect to the ioi lots, the transfer and subsequent disposition bifurcates
the total gain (the sum of the property owner's gain and the developer's
income) into two categories: gain from the property's appreciation in value
and income from the developer's services. The former is appropriately taxed
at 15%, and the latter is appropriately taxed at 35%. Of course, that
bifurcation does not occur with respect to the 99 sales, all the gain of which
was taxed at 15%, even though some of it derived from the property owner's
services.
Selling a large portion of the property to a developer helps bifurcate
the income but does not appear to reduce social welfare. Nonetheless,
changes in linear behavior shift some economic benefit from the original
owner to the developer. Property owners recognize the consequence of
linear changes in behavior and may consider other alternatives that, for
example, will allow them to gain the economic benefit of developing the
property without converting capital gain to ordinary income. The law
124. This analysis does not apply to every line-drawing situation. For example, if a person
changes behavior to drive within the speed limit, that changed behavior does not necessarily
mean that another person will drive faster to obtain the benefit forfeited by the slower driver.
Furthermore, the driver's slower speed does not necessarily reduce social welfare, so the
analysis would not look to see if someone else can fill the void created by the slower driver.
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sanctions these alternatives,'25 apparently realizing that doing so will not
affect social welfare but will allow the original owner the full benefit of
ownership. Sanctioning alternatives results in a de facto reorientation of the
line and a cumbersome law. Assuming de facto reorientation is not abusive,
lawmakers may recognize that it occurs and take steps to formally reorient
the line to further eliminate inequity and to make the law simpler.
Thus far, this Article has primarily considered the consequences of
drawing the line at some point based upon sales. The number of sales is a
crude proxy for determining the source of income, and the all-or-nothing
approach of a single line does not accurately identify the different sources of
income. It is very rare that a sale does not require some activity on the part
of the owner, and every sale at a gain conceivably consists of some
appreciation in the property's value that occurs independently of the
property owner's efforts. As a consequence, gain from most sales of property
consists of both gain derived from the property's appreciation in value and
gain attributable to the property owner's efforts.' 6 The all-or-nothing
approach ensures that some income from services is taxed at capital gains
rates or some gains from appreciation in value are taxed at ordinary income
rates. To accurately tax the respective types of income, the law would have to
draw the line using criteria other than the number of sales.
A. DEFACTO REORIENTA TION
A single property owner may adopt a court-sanctioned structure to lock-
in the gain from the property's appreciation in value and expose only the
portion of income derived from services to the 35% rate.5 7 Thus, owners
may lock-in the portion of gain attributable to appreciation in value at
capital gains rates and retain all of the economic benefit of developing the
property. The structure requires the property owner to form multiple tax
entities (see Figure 25). One entity holds the property as investment
property and allows it to appreciate in value (the "investment entity").128
125. See generally Bramblett v. Comm'r, 96o F.2d 526 (5 th Cir. 1992); Bradshaw v. United
States, 683 F.2d 365 (Ct. Cl. 1982); Boyer v. Comm'r, 58 T.C. 316 (1972).
126. Many factors affect the property's appreciation in value. For example, a property
owner could expend considerable effort on improving and selling property but realize a
significant boost in value when a major retailer announces it will build a store next to the
property. Different criteria could reorient the line and make the law more equitable. In the
absence of de jure reorientation, property owners resorted to self-help strategies, which courts
have since sanctioned. See supra note 125. Lawmakers could go further, explicitly reorient the
line, and make the law simpler. Similarly, rezoning of a piece of property may not require
significant effort but could affect a property's value.
127. See generally Bramblett, 96o F.2d 526.
128. Generally, property has several owners who own the property in an entity treated as a
partnership for tax purposes. For example, the owners may form a limited liability company to
hold the property for investment purposes. A limited liability company with two members is
treated as a tax partnership, see Treas. Reg. § 3 o. 7 701-3(b) (2012), so the gain it recognizes
will flow through to the owners with the same character recognized by the limited liability
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When the property owner is prepared to develop the property, the
investment entity transfers the property to a separate entity that is
designated as the developer of the property (the "developer entity").129 In
exchange for transferring the property, the investment entity takes back the
developer entity's installment note.13 o The face value of the note should
equal the fair market value of the property at the time of the transfer, which
should include only the property's appreciation in value up to the time of
transfer. Because the investment entity disposes of the property in one sale,
any gain it recognizes on the transfer to the developer entity should be
capital gain subject to favorable capital gain rates. The property in the
developer entity's hands will be inventory, and the gain the developer entity
recognizes will derive primarily from the developer entity's activities-and
thus, should be ordinary income.
company. See I.R.C. § 701 (providing that income flows through to the partners, and the tax
partnership does not pay tax on the income); id. § 702(b) (providing that the character of gain
that a partner recognizes carries through from the partnership).
129. The property owner generally has the developer entity elect to be a subchapter S
corporation. Subchapter S status allows the gain from the sale of property to pass through to
the shareholders untaxed at the corporate level. See I.R.C. § 1363(a) (providing that an S
corporation is not subject to income tax); id. § 136 6 (a) (providing that the shareholders of an S
corporation shall report the corporation's income). The developer entity cannot be a tax
partnership because the transfer from the investment entity to a related tax partnership would
cause the gain recognized by the investment entity to be ordinary income. See id. § 7 o 7 (b) (2).
Consequently, the developer entity in this type of structure is almost always a subchapter S
corporation.
130. See Bramblett, 96o F.2d at 529. The use of the installment note is not unexpected. The
developer entity would likely not have funds available to purchase the property. The developer
entity will borrow funds or receive them from the owners to develop the property. When it
ultimately sells the developed property, it will use a portion of the proceeds to pay the note to
the investment entity. The developer entity's lack of funds to acquire property from the
investment entity is not surprising. The structure exists primarily to lock-in the gain attributable
to the property's appreciation in value. The investment entity and the developer entity are part
of the same economic unit. The property owner, who controls the economic unit, has already
invested to acquire the property in the investment entity. That owner would not invest
additional funds to acquire the property from the investment unit.
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The lock-in structure can be both advantageous and disadvantageous,
depending upon a property owner's situation in relation to the line. The
lock-in structure would be disadvantageous to property owners to the left of
the line. All of the gain recognized by those property owners will be taxed at
15%. The lock-in structure would not improve their situations, and could
even make their situations worse by causing them to incur the costs to form
the lock-in structure and converting some gain (i.e., the gain recognized by
the developer entity) to ordinary income.13, The after-tax gain with the lock-
in structure would be less than the after-tax gain at the point with no
structuring. Consequently, rational property owners to the left of the line
would not use the lock-in structure.
The lock-in structure could be advantageous to property owners to the
right of the line. Those property owners have the option of using the lock-in
structure or changing their situations by using fewer sales to move to the left
of the line. They will change their situations if the opportunity cost of
changing situations plus the tax at the new situation is less than the cost to
use the lock-in structure plus the tax liability with the lock-in structure at
their original situation.132 The result of some property owners changing
131. If the number of sales would not cause the property to be inventory in the hands of
the investment entity, the same number of sales should not cause the property to be inventory
in the hands of the developer entity. Consequently, a change in tax rate would be attributable
to the developer entity's shorter holding period.
132. This scenario assumes the cost of the lock-in structure is nominal per square foot
because the size of the property is so large. Consequently, it disregards the cost. The cost of the
structure could become important for smaller projects.
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situations by moving to the left of the line generates a curve similar to the
modified-tax-liability curve, but it narrows the no-sale range and shifts
downward to the right of the second kink. Figure 26 represents the
modified-tax-liability curve, the modified-tax-liability curve with lock-in, and
the normative curve. Notice that the modified-tax-liability curve and
modified-tax-liability curve with lock-in are parallel for situations to the right
of the second kink. The difference between the two curves after that point is
attributed to the portion of gain taxed at 15% as a result of the lock-in
structure.'33
FIGURE 26
EFFECT OF LOCK-IN STRUCTURE
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133. The difference is equivalent to 20% of the $0.50 gain per square foot taxed at 15%
instead of 35%.
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Figure 27 suggests that inequity will be lower if property owners have
the option to use the lock-in structure. The highest single-point inequity in
that curve (0.67) is lower than the highest single-point inequity resulting
from the modified tax liability (0.78) (see Figure 18). The average inequity
(0.32) of the modified tax liability with lock-in is also lower than the average
(0.42) of the modified tax liability (see Figure 18).
FIGURE 27
MODIFIED INEQUITY WITH LOCK-IN STRUCTURE
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Average: 0.32








Because the modified tax liability with lock-in generates a curve similar
to the modified-tax-liability curve, the overall-inequity that results from using
a lock-in structure (see Figure 28) should be similar to the overall inequity
curve derived from the modified tax liability (see Figure 23).'34 Even though
the lock-in structure helps reduce line-drawing inequity, some nominal
amount of inequity will exist.,35 Thus, while the judicial sanction of the lock-
in structure does not eliminate inequity, it does reduce it significantly.
FIGURE 28
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134. The curves in Figure 28 are based on expected results, leaving the nature of the curve
representing the highest single-point inequity in Figure 23 somewhat of a mystery.
135. The lock-in structure creates other inequities because such structures are cost-
prohibitive for low-value deals. The owners of low-value property could justify incurring the cost
to form the lock-in structure because the tax savings obtained by forming the structure would
not be sufficient to cover the costs of the structure. In this scenario, all property owners have
property of the same value, so each could similarly afford the cost of using the lock-in structure.
If the property in question were smaller, however, the property owner may not benefit from the
lock-in structure because the cost of creating it may outweigh the tax benefits.
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The line-drawing inequity analysis provides further evidence that the
closer the line is drawn to the o-sale situation, the less inequity there will be
in the system. Thus, one way to eliminate the inequity is to draw the line at
the i-sale situation and require all other property owners to either pay tax at
35% or use the lock-in structure. Drawing the line close to the i-sale
situation also reduces the inefficiency of line-drawing (see Figure 29).
FIGURE 29
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The inefficiency in this scenario is lower than it was when the model did
not account for the lock-in structure.136 The lower inefficiency results in part
from the lower overall tax revenue raised using bifurcation. The law could,
of course, raise the same amount of tax revenue using bifurcation by
adjusting the tax rates. That would allow the government to collect the same
amount of revenue with a fairer, more efficient law. With either structure,
inefficiency is at its lowest when the line is drawn close to the i-sale situation.
The lock-in structure probably would not affect social costs significantly
because the owner would develop the property to its most optimal use and
pay tax at the appropriate rates on the respective types of income.
Nonetheless, the lock-in structure allows the owner to retain the full
economic benefit of developing the property.
136. See supra Figure 2 3.
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The lock-in structure effectively reorients the line with respect to all
situations to the right of the second kink on the modified-tax-liability curve
with lock-in. For all of those situations, a lower tax rate applies to gain on the
transfer of property from the investor entity to the developer entity, and the
higher tax rate applies to gain the developer entity recognizes.
Consequently, the structure separates the gain into gain from appreciation
in value and gain from services. The tax rate for those situations does not
depend upon the number of sales. Instead, it depends upon the source of
income. Thus, the structure uses criteria other than sales to draw the line. As
this Article next illustrates, the lock-in structure is a de facto reorientation of
the line, but lawmakers could institute dejure reorientation as well.
B. DEJuRE REORIENTA TION
Consider how lawmakers could bifurcate the gain and explicitly
reorient the line. Assume that if a property owner uses i sale to dispose of
the property, the property owner will recognize $o. 5 1 of gain per square
foot. Because the property owner uses a single sale to dispose of the
property, the property owner's activities will have a negligible effect on the
income derived from the sale. Consequently, the gain from the sale of the
property using i sale derives almost exclusively from the property's
appreciation in value, and all but a small portion of the gain should be taxed
at ordinary rates. For the sake of analysis, assume that $o.oi of the gain per
square foot at the i-sale situation derives from services, and $0.50 of the
gain per square foot derives from the property's appreciation in value.'57
If $0.50 of gain per square foot derives from the property's
appreciation in value, any gain in excess of that amount must derive from
the property owner's services. Thus, the model assumes that property owners
have a choice to sell the property with no additional effort and recognize
$0.51 of gain per square foot (including the $o.oi of gain that derives from
the nominal services), or they can expend effort to sell the property using
more than one sale. Regardless of how many sales a property owner uses to
dispose of the property, gain equal to $o.5o per square foot will derive from
the property's appreciation in value. As a result, if the property owner uses
2oo sales to dispose of the property and recognizes $2.50 of gain per square
foot, $o.5o of the gain will derive from appreciation in value and the
137. Making such a determination would, of course, be fraught with difficulty. With such a
small portion of the income deriving from services, the law should not require the property
owner or the IRS to dissect the gain at this level. Instead, it would most likely allow the property
owner to report all of the gain at capital-gain rates if the services are de minimis. At some point,
however, the gain from the services would cease to be de minimis, at which point, the law would
have to require the property owner to determine the source of the gain. The point at which the
law would draw such a line would raise line-drawing questions. For the sake of analysis, this




remaining $2.00 of that gain will derive from services. Figure 30 depicts the
source of income at each point on the continuum and identifies how the law
could tax that gain if it had perfect information to bifurcate income.
FIGURE 30
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Notice that in Figure 3o , a horizontal line, as opposed to a vertical line,
separates the gain from the property's appreciation in value and income
from services. The number of sales affects the amount of income that derives
from services but does not affect the amount of gain that derives from
appreciation in value. Bifurcating the income based upon its source thus
reorients the line. By reorienting the line, the law uses a different criterion
(i.e., source of income) and disposes of the less-effective proxy (i.e., sales)
used to identify source.
Because the number of sales does not affect the amount of gain that
derives from the property's appreciation in value, using it as a proxy will
invariably cause inequity. Some of the gain on the left side of the vertical
sales-oriented line will derive from services, but all of it will be taxed at 15%.
As expected, some of the gain on the right side of the line will derive from
the property's appreciation in value, but all of it will be taxed at 35%. The
reason for this result is that the number of sales does not perfectly identify
the source of income. Optically, the vertical line is inappropriate because
the line separating income from appreciation in value and income from
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services is properly horizontal. Surely a vertical line will not adequately
capture a distinction represented by a horizontal line. The law could
reorient the line from vertical to horizontal by changing the criteria it uses
to draw the line.
Figure 30 suggests that the law should impose a tax of 15% on the gain
derived from appreciation in value and 35% on the income derived from
services. The tax liability computed using that formula would increase as the
number of sales increases, which would likewise cause the income from
services to increase. The curve representing the tax liability would slope
upward in a straight line. Comparing the tax-liability curve derived from
bifurcating income with the normative-tax-liability curve (see Figure 31)
suggests that inequity would almost completely disappear if the law
bifurcated income.,s8
FIGURE 31
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138. The bifurcation approach solicits a question: Should the tax-liability curve that derives
from the bifurcation approach be the normative curve? A convincing argument could be made
that it should be because the bifurcation approach considers the source of income, which
reflects the purpose of the distinction between the two tax rates. If the analysis adopted the tax-
liability curve with bifurcation, using the bifurcation approach would eliminate inequity. The
use of the bifurcation curve as the norm would not, however, materially alter the results above
because the bifurcation tax liability is similar to the normative-tax-liability curve.
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Despite the obvious benefits of bifurcating income, the difficulty of
bifurcation lies in accurately identifying the source of income. Such a
determination requires an actual value of the property computed without
regard to gain from services, which would entail a factual inquiry into every
disposition of property. Critics may argue that such an inquiry would be too
onerous and result in litigation over the proper bifurcation of the gain.
Under the current system, however, both property owners and the
government already struggle to identify the line that separates capital assets
from inventory, a costly endeavor in and of itself.,39 Moving to a bifurcation
method may not cause more litigation or costs, but might, in the worst case
scenario, merely replace existing costs. If changing the orientation of a line
would result in a more equitable, efficient, and accurate measurement of tax
liability at no additional cost, the law should change the orientation of the
line.
In fact, the issue of valuation already exists with the lock-in structure,
and the law appears to handle it sufficiently. The lock-in structure bifurcates
gain and requires valuation of the property at the time the investment entity
transfers property to the developer entity. If the IRS wished to challenge the
tax consequences of a lock-in structure it could attack the value assigned to
the property at the time the investment entity transfers it to the developer
entity.,4o The published cases on point generally have not considered
whether the value assigned to the property at the time of transfer is
accurate.'4' This suggests that the IRS does not often challenge the value
assigned by property owners, or that the IRS and property owners are able to
agree upon a reasonable value during pre-trial negotiations.,4 Thus, the
valuation issue does not appear insurmountable.
Recognizing that valuation is no absolute barrier, lawmakers could
focus on refining the law to adopt de facto reorientation. This could be
accomplished by merely requiring property owners to establish the portion
of gain derived from the property's appreciation in value and the portion
139. The cases that have considered whether property is a capital asset or inventory are
legion. See cases cited supra note 44.
140. If the property owners do not properly structure the transaction, the IRS could
challenge the transaction on other grounds. See, e.g., Bradshaw v. United Sates, 683 F.2d 365,
371-77 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (considering whether the transfer to the developer corporation was a
sale or a contribution); Boyer v. Comm'r, 58 T.C. 316, 323-26 (1972) (considering whether a
corporation was a mere alter ego of the shareholder). With existing case law available to inform
property owners how to structure lock-in transactions, valuation should remain the only issue
subject to dispute, assuming property owners follow precedent in structuring the arrangements.
141. The cases that consider lock-in structures focus on other issues. See cases cited supra
note 140.
142. Under § 482 of the Internal Revenue Code, the IRS has authority to reallocate items
of income and deduction among the related parties. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1 (as amended in
2009). The IRS could use that provision to challenge the value assigned to the property at the
date the investment entity transfers property to the developer entity.
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derived from services related to the property. Property owners who deploy
the lock-in structure establish the value of property at the time the
investment entity transfers the property to the developer entity. That
transfer signals a conversion of the property from capital asset to inventory
and also signals that gain following the transfer will derive from services.
Thus, the lock-in structure creates a specific event that helps property
owners identify the amount of gain that derives from their property's
appreciation in value and the amount that derives from services.
The option to use the lock-in structure makes bifurcation implicitly
elective. The law could eliminate the cost of the lock-in structure, though, by
making the lock-in explicitly elective.,43 In the case of property that
appreciates in value and is then developed, the law could require property
owners to state the value of the property at the time they begin subdivision
or other efforts to sell the property. Property owners could do that by
completing information on a tax return or by filing a separate report. An
affirmative statement of the property's value will put the IRS on notice that
the property owner is bifurcating income. The property owners will know
that the IRS has that information and that it could challenge the validity of
the amount stated on the return. That awareness may encourage property
owners to exercise greater care in establishing the value of the property
prior to performing any services. The report would serve the purpose now
served by the note transferred to the investment entity under the lock-in
structure.
The law probably should not require bifurcation for every situation on
the continuum. At the far left, only a small portion of the gain derives from
services. Requiring property owners to bifurcate gain at the far left of the
continuum may create more costs than bifurcation justifies. Not requiring
bifurcation will result in some inequity because a portion of income from
services would be taxed at 15%, but recall that the inequity of drawing a line
close to the i-sale point is fairly 1ow.'44 The cost to remove that small amount
of inequity may not justify its elimination. For example, the law might draw a
line at the 25-sale point and tax the 25-sale situation and all points to its left
at 15%. It would tax all other situations using the bifurcation method,
resulting in a modified-tax-liability curve that is very similar to the normative-
tax-liability curve (see Figure 32). The inequity resulting from drawing the
line at that point should also be very low (see Figure 28). Thus, the law may
143. Lock-in is implicitly elective under current law, but it requires property owners to
assemble the lock-in structure. The Author attributes the idea of the lock-in election to E. John
Wagner, 11, a tax attorney at Williams, Parker, Harrison, Dietz & Getzen, PA, in Sarasota,
Florida, who originally conveyed the idea to the Author in an informal discussion. Interview
with E. John Wagner, II, Tax Attorney, Williams, Parker, Harrison, Dietz & Getzen, PA, in Boca
Raton, Fla. (Jan. 22, 201 1). A more detailed discussion of the idea is the topic of a planned
article by the Author, Mr. Wagner, and Nathan R. Brown.
144. See supra Figure 28.
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adopt the bifurcation method but allow for a de minimis amount of activity
without triggering bifurcation and taxing some gain at ordinary income
rates.
FIGURE 32
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This discussion illustrates that reorienting a line may help reduce the
inequity that results from line-drawing. If line-drawing does appear to cause
inequity, lawmakers and commentators should ask whether the line's
orientation is proper, which will generally require carefully examining the
criteria used to draw the line. Doing so may reveal that the criteria do not
adequately align with the purposes of the law, and also may indicate that the
line may be oriented incorrectly. As a case in point, the number of sales is
not the best criterion for determining source of income from the disposition
of property. Instead, source of income appears to be a better criterion than
number of sales, and using that criterion can in fact reduce inequity.145
145. Granting property owners the authority to bifurcate gain is not without potential
limitations. The discussion up to this point has assumed that property owners acquire and hold
property for some time before deciding to develop and sell it. The analysis also assumes that any
change in value of the property after the date of value designation derives from the services. In
many situations, the property owner may begin to perform services with respect to the property
on the date of acquisition. Furthermore, some of the increase in the property's sales price after
the services begin could be attributable to the increase in the value of the property. The lock-in
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VII. INEQUITY SIGNALS LINE-DRAWING DEFECTS
The model developed in this Article sheds new light on line-drawing
analysis. In particular, it may help identify the existence of defective lines in
the law. To understand its uses, however, one must consider its limitations.
The model only applies to line-drawing along a continuum, and the
conclusions it reaches only apply to line-drawing scenarios that involve
continua. The inapplicability of the model may, however, signal that a law is
equitable.
To illustrate this point, the model would not apply to the bifurcation
method because that method does not create a continuum. Instead, the
bifurcation method merely divides the gain into two categories based upon
the source of income-on one side is gain from appreciation in value, and
on the other is income from services. The income could not be sorted on
either side of the line based on the degree to which the income is from a
particular source. The gain from both sources, whether appreciation in
value or gain from services, will be static within the category. No portion of
the gain in either category will be closer to or further from the line. As a
consequence, the model will not help determine the inequity of drawing a
line between the two types of gain.
Furthermore, if the gain is categorized appropriately, the system will not
create inequity. By design, the law treats gain from appreciation in value
differently from income from services. The relevant criterion for such
treatment is the source of income. If the law accurately determines the
source, taxing the sources differently will not be inequitable, assuming the
differentiation has merit.146 The result is a completely equitable system, even
though the tax rates for the two types of income vary significantly. The
inapplicability of the model in the bifurcation scenario signals the
effectiveness of the line.
Other scenarios that cannot order situations along a continuum may
benefit from quantitative inequity analysis, and the initial apparent
inapplicability of the model may signal the law's failure to identify the
purpose for drawing the line. Indeed, inequity model would be useless if the
law were to have no clearly defined purpose. For example, the law
distinguishes between the various tax entities (e.g., tax corporations, tax
partnerships, and disregarded arrangements).,47 The law has had terrible
difficulty drawing lines between these various entities. For decades, courts
and the Federal Treasury tried to identify the relevant differences between
(whether formalistic or elective) does not account for that portion of the gain as gain from the
property's appreciation in value. Even with these weaknesses, however, the lock-in method
appears to be more equitable and efficient than the current system.
146. See supra text accompanying notes 20-30 (stating the assumption).
147. SeeTreas. Reg. § 301.7701-3 (2012).
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tax corporations and tax partnerships.,48 The Treasury finally threw in the
towel and promulgated an elective regime (known as "check-the-box
regulations"), which classifies state-law corporations as tax corporations and
grants all other domestic multi-number business entities the election to be
tax corporations or, in some cases, tax partnerships.'4o The model would
have difficulty testing the inequity of this system of line-drawing because the
criteria for separating the entities are unclear due to the lack of defined
purpose for having these different tax entities.,so
The entity-classification regime clearly creates inequity because the law
treats identical situations differently. For example, two limited liability
companies with at least two members could be a tax corporation and a tax
partnership, respectively, even though they are identical in every other
respects. This obvious inequity, and the inability to measure it using
quantitative inequity analysis, confirms the lack of clear purpose and
relevant criteria for the distinction. These problems suggest that more effort
is required to identify the purpose of corporate tax and tax-entity
classification. If that purpose were known, the model may help identify the
appropriate locations of lines separating the different entities. The rationale
for the elective regime is that it codified the implicit elective regime that
existed prior to the promulgation of the check-the-box regulations.,5'
Unlike the elective lock-in structure, however, the elections in both tax-
entity classification regimes failed to account for the purpose of the tax-
entity classification rules, so they were both faulty. The law must better
identify the purpose of tax-entity classification to eliminate inequity, such as
the inequity caused by implicit elections. The inability to do so signals a
deficiency in the rules governing tax-entity classification.
148. See Steven A. Dean, Attractive Complexity: Tax Deregulation, the Check-the-Box Election, and
the Future of Tax Simplification, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 405, 421-51 (2005) (recounting the history
of tax-entity classification prior to the check-the-box regulations).
149. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (providing that a state-law corporation is an association
for tax purposes); id. § 301.7701-3 (providing the elective regime).
15o . Theorists are unable to reach a consensus regarding the purpose of the various tax
entities. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen & Deborah M. Weiss, A Political Theory of Corporate Taxation, 105
YALE L.J. 325, 359-62 (1995) (arguing that managers may support a corporate tax because it
provides a disincentive to distribute excess capital); Kim Brooks, Learning To Live with an
Imperfect Tax: A Defence of the Corporate Tax, 36 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REv. 621, 630-54 (2003)
(listing the following factors as support for the corporate tax: it is progressive, it facilitates
efficient raising of tax revenue, it prevents unlimited deferral, it has political support, it is
entrenched in the current system, and repealing it would raise significant costs); Heather M.
Field, Checking In on "Check-the-Box," 42 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 451 (2009) (critiquing the various
theories presented in support of the corporate tax).
151. See Susan Pace Hamill, The Taxation of Domestic Limited Liability Companies and Limited
Partnerships: A Case for Eliminating the Partnership Classification Regulations, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 565,
6oo (1995) ("[T]he well advised have always been able to avoid the corporate tax by forming as
a partnership or LLC that complies with the classification regulations.... .").
2013] 1037
SIOWA LA W REVIEW
The line between tax partnerships and disregarded arrangements
remains to be drawn. A significant body of law has considered whether an
arrangement falls into one of those two categories, but the various
authorities are inconclusive.152 The Author has recommended different
types of residual risk as the criteria that the law should use to draw the
distinction.'53 If the law were to adopt those criteria, a continuum would not
be obvious, as the differences between methods for computing residual risk
are generally apparent. So using different types of residual risk would create
bright lines with no degree of separation within categories. The potential
disappearance of the continuum suggests that the current criteria are
inappropriate. Different criteria may help establish a line similar to that
resulting from bifurcating income in the property-owner scenario.
These few examples help illustrate how quantitative inequity can inform
line-drawing analysis. Lawmakers and commentators must be familiar with
the nuances and purposes of laws to effectively analyze the appropriateness
of line-drawing in each scenario. This model reveals techniques that may
help assess the inequity that may arise from line-drawing in those various
scenarios.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This Article introduces a model for quantifying inequity that results
from drawing a line to classify situations that lie along a continuum. The
model reveals several important attributes of line-drawing. First, the model
reveals that inequity analysis is a substantive analytical tool that helps
quantify line-drawing inequity. Second, the model reveals that the location
of a line may affect the amount of the resulting inequity. Third, this model
reveals that the behavior of those governed by lines in the law may affect
inequity that the law has created. If individuals can change their situations at
little cost to obtain more favorable treatment under the law, the inequity
inherent in line-drawing decreases. Fourth, the criteria used to draw the line
may not be perfect proxies for the law's purpose, which may manifest itself
in a line's orientation. Lawmakers may be able to reduce inequity by
eliminating weak proxies and appropriately reorienting the line. Finally, the
law may become more equitable if it adopts explicit elections that relate to
the purpose of the law.
152. See Bradley T. Borden, The Federal Definition of Tax Partnership, 43 Hous. L. REV. 925,
975-1001 (2oo6) (presenting various tests that lawmakers use to determine whether an
arrangement is a tax partnership or some other type of arrangement).
153. See Bradley T. Borden, Residual-Risk Model for Classfying Business Arrangements, 37 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 245, 291-94 (2010) (recommending that the distinction between tax
partnerships and disregarded arrangements should turn on whether a particular arrangement




The model also challenges long-standing assumptions about the tension
between equity and efficiency. Applying the model to the property-owner
scenario showed that inequity and inefficiency may correlate positively.
Because line-drawing occurs in many scenarios that include continua,
further study is needed to know whether this outcome is unique to the tax
scenario discussed herein, or if the analysis has a more universal application.
To the extent that inefficiency becomes nominal, as it may do in the
property-owner scenario, quantitative inequity becomes the prominent
analytical tool. Thus, its significance may be grossly underestimated.
The implications of quantitative inequity are substantial. In addition to
expanding the general understanding of inequity analysis and the
consequences of line-drawing, the analysis may inform lawmakers and
commentators when they are tasked with drawing lines in the law. If the
inequity from line-drawing appears excessively high, one or more of several
problems may exist. The line may be in the wrong location, the governed
may be unable to change their situations at low cost, the criteria may be
inappropriate, or the elections may be implicit. Recognizing these potential
problems will allow lawmakers to change laws to help reduce inequity.
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